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PROPERTY IS ONLY ANOTHER NAME FOR
MONOPOLY
Eric A. Posner* and E. Glen Weyl**
ABSTRACT
The existing system of private property interferes with allocative efficiency by giving
owners the power to hold out for excessive prices. We propose a remedy in the form of a
tax on property, based on the value self-assessed by its owner at intervals, along with a
requirement that the owner sell the property to any third party willing to pay a price
equal to the self-assessed value. The tax ratewould reflect a tradeoff betweengains from
allocative efficiency and losses to investment efficiency, likely in the range of 5 to 10
percent annually for most assets. We discuss the detailed design of this system from an
economic and legal perspective.
INTRODUCTION
Property rights of all sorts—in real estate, in shares of corporations, and in
radio spectrum, to take three diverse examples—give the owner a monopoly
over a resource. It is conventional to think that this monopoly is benign. It gives
the owner an incentive to invest in improving the property because she receives
the entire payoff from its use or sale. This aligns social and private incentives for
investment in property. This thinking plays a role in libertarian defenses of
private property and in the influential work of legal economists deriving
from the Coase Theorem (see, e.g., Epstein 1997).
However, the monopoly also creates a serious cost that is often overlooked.
Because the owner has a monopoly, she will attempt to sell the property at a
“monopoly price”, one above the minimum she would be willing to accept for
her asset and thus the price she would charge in a market where many
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individuals with similar valuations of substantially identical property to the
owner compete to make a sale. Just like a normal monopolist, a property
owner sets a price that approximates what the seller thinks that the likely
buyer’s valuation or reservation price for the property is. Because some
buyers will have a valuation that is lower than the announced price but
higher than the seller’s valuation, some efficient sales will be blocked or delayed.
This inhibits the allocation of property to its most valuable uses, a crucial
component of a successful market economy. Macroeconomists have found
that failure of assets to be reallocated to their most efficient uses is a major
drag on aggregate productivity around the world (see our discussion in
Subsection 4.2 further).
When this problem is discussed, authors usually refer to it as the “holdout
problem”, most familiar in the context of development of real property and
purchases of mineral rights and other natural resources, where projects can fail
because sellers hold out for excessive prices. The problem also arises promin-
ently in transactions over corporate assets, including corporate takeovers, where
negotiations often get bogged down in discussions over the transaction price.
The Federal Communications Commission has spent the last seven years pre-
paring an auction and property-redefinition procedure to deal with holdout
problems that have inhibited the reallocation of spectrum to more efficient uses
(Eisenach 2011, p. 88; Kominers & Weyl, 2012, p. 362–63; Milgrom & Segal
2015). In intellectual property, scholars have long understood that monopoly
power granted to inventors through patent law interferes with allocative effi-
ciency—exemplified by the “patent troll” controversy (Lemley & Shapiro 2007).
But the problem is much more general. In every transaction—home and car
sales, sales of ordinary goods, and so on—private property creates bargaining
problems that interfere with allocative efficiency. To put this problem starkly:
allocative efficiency and thus an efficient market economy is impossible in the
presence of private ownership.
This problem was first clearly articulated by the “marginal revolutionaries”,
Jevons (1871) and Walras (1896), who laid the foundation for modern formal
economic analysis. They, together with George (1879), another prominent
economist of the late 19th century, believed that the only solution to the mon-
opoly problem was nationalization (through taxation) of many forms of prop-
erty. Building on their arguments, the socialist economist Lerner (1944)
advocated state ownership of property, together with a public “mechanism”
that distributed possessory rights of property to users who valued them the
most. In his Nobel prize-winning work, Vickrey (1961) (a follower of George)
described how an auction could serve that function. Property is owned in
common; the government would allocate temporary possessory and control
interests in the property (effectively, leases) to the winners of an auction.
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Because users would eventually be required to return property to the govern-
ment, they could not hold out for a monopoly price, or indeed sell their prop-
erty at all. The modern literature on mechanism design and related work in law
and economics, which was initiated by Vickrey’s contributions, have further
refined our understanding of the monopoly problem with private property, and
explored ways in which markets can be designed to mitigate it (e.g., Myerson &
Satterthwaite 1983).
However, this literature has ignored the traditional concern with common
ownership.1 As we noted at the outset, the benefit of the monopoly granted by
private property rights is that it gives the owner an incentive to invest in the
property to enhance its value. If the owner can charge whatever price she wants
when she sells the property, she will be compensated for an investment that
increases its value, because she can increase the price to reflect the increase in
value added by her investment. If she cannot—if she must instead return the
property to “society” (meaning, to government officials)—then she has weak
incentives to invest in it.2 Probably for this reason, Vickrey’s proposal has never
been seriously considered by a government.
Instead, the governments of countries where modern market economies exist
have addressed the tension between allocative efficiency and investment effi-
ciency by adopting something like a “mixed regime” that consists of strong
private property rights for most ordinary types of property and significant
deviations in special cases. These deviations include liability rules in tort law
for relatively indirect forms of property-rights violation; adverse possession of
unused property; time-limited property rights (generally used for intellectual
property, but also for a range of government-leased resources like grazing land);
redefinition of property rights in the light of technological change (such as with
the radio spectrum discussed above); public ownership in limited cases (e.g.,
roads); and various jury-rigged forms of government intervention like eminent
domain for private uses (see discussion in Subsection 4.3 above ). In all of these
cases, the deviation from private property reduces the holdout problem and
1 By common ownership, we refer to property of which more than one person has the right to
proceeds from a sale. In the case of the Vickrey commons and our proposal, the proceeds from
sales are effectively shared by everyone in society according to some rule as we describe in Subsection
2.1. When lawyers use this term, they frequently have in mind an additional feature: the right of
more than one person to occupy and control the property. Joint owners of a house both control the
house and share the proceeds from the sale. For purposes of this article, we use the term only in the
first sense, and exclude the second.
2 As we discuss further below, however, social ownership may promote investment by individuals
other than the possessor who may contribute in more diffuse ways, such as through the creation of
public goods, to the value of the asset.
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thus enhances allocative efficiency, while paying the price in the form of
reduced incentives for private investment.
And yet there are serious problems with this mixed regime. First, it does not
address the monopoly problem for a huge range of transactions—reallocating
mineral rights, haggling over the purchase of a used car, months-long negoti-
ations over house sales, corporate acquisitions that can drag on for years. In
these cases, investment efficiency is maintained, but allocative efficiency is
sacrificed. Second, where the regime addresses allocative efficiency by deviating
from private property, it relies heavily on bureaucratic or judicial valuations to
ensure some level of compensation for the forced sale or transfer, or it denies
compensation altogether. But the denial of compensation eliminates invest-
ment incentives, and imperfect government-supplied valuations and other
forms of intervention interfere both with allocative efficiency and investment
efficiency. While the deviations from private property may produce better out-
comes for society than a system without such deviations, they fall far short of
the social optimum. Our present system mixes elements of an extreme form of
capitalism with the more naı¨ve forms of central planning.
In this article, we consider a third way, one that involves a system of self-
assessed property taxation first proposed by Harberger (1965) for the purposes of
raising tax revenue.3 Under this Harberger tax, as we call it, people periodically
report valuations of their property to a government registry; pay property taxes
based on these valuations; and are required to sell their property at these valu-
ations to any buyer. A key component of this proposal is that buyers can force
sales—limiting a longstanding element of private property, which is that the
person who owns property keeps it until she consents to sale. The Harberger
tax is a radical departure from our current system of private property in one
sense—people are no longer “owners”; they are more like lessees—and yet it at
the same time amplifies the operation of the market economy rather than cur-
tailing it. People maintain the freedom to hold onto their property if they are
willing to self-assess a high valuation; economic decisions are made by individ-
uals, not by the government; and market competition remains the dominant
force in the economy, indeed gains in importance relative to the current
system. From a legal standpoint, the Harberger system creates a type of property
that replaces the “right to exclude” with a “right to exclude anyone who does not
3 For an early review and criticisms, see Holland & Vaughn (1962, p. 79). The idea was further
developed by Saul Levmore (1982), and has received renewed attention in recent years in the law
and economics literature; see, e.g, Abramowicz (1999, p. 364–373); Fennell (2005, p. 1444);
Lewinsohn-Zamir (2009, p. 1398–1399); Epstein (2014, p. 111). Versions of the tax were also
proposed by the Chinese revolutionary and statesman, Sun Yat-sen, at the beginning of the twentieth
century, see Niou and Tan (1994), and Maurice Allais (1976, p. 104–106), a Nobel prize-winning
French economist, in 1976
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pay the self-assessed price”. Another way to think of our proposal is as a kind of
“partial ownership”, halfway between private ownership (the current system) and
common ownership (the system advocated by Walras, George, and Lerner).
In one sense, our proposal is not new; the Harberger tax has attracted some
attention in the law and economics literature, primarily as a means of raising
revenue, and related mechanisms have been used extensively in practice in
horse racing, mutual insurance arrangements, and the dissolution of partnerships,
among other settings (Hall 1986; Cabrales et al. 2003; Brooks et al. 2010).
Furthermore, we build our argument on a proposal by one of us (Weyl) and
Anthony Zhang (Weyl & Zhang 2017), who prove mathematically the superiority
of the Harberger tax under standard economic assumptions. However, none of
this work has confronted the many social, legal, and policy issues facing the use of
Harberger taxation in practice and thus none has offered a detailed account of how
it could offer a broad-scale solution to the monopoly power created by property.
This is unfortunate because at a time of increased concerns about the slowdown in
productivity growth and the rise in inequality, a reform like Harberger taxation
that has the potential to address both problems deserves to be taken seriously.4
Our primary contribution in this article is, therefore, to put flesh on these bones,
use the underlying theory to shed light on themes in the literature on property law,
and address the practical, philosophical, and legal challenges that it would meet
beyond the relative narrow concerns confronted in the previous literature, which
focuses either on the excessively simplified models of economic theory or on very
narrow applications where these challenges are less salient.
In Section 1, we set out the theory behind the Harberger tax. We argue that
while private property enhances investment efficiency but interferes with allo-
cative efficiency, and common ownership interferes with investment efficiency
but enhances allocative efficiency, the Harberger tax optimizes across both
forms of efficiency. We also address the magnitude of the optimal Harberger
tax, arguing that the rate of taxation will be higher in cases where asset markets
are illiquid (asymmetric information about values is rampant) and lower in
cases where the value of property depends heavily on investments that are
difficult for an outsider to observe.
In Section 2, we address design issues, such as the use of the revenue gener-
ated by the tax, the structure of rates charged, etc. In addition, we discuss legal
and technological infrastructure that would support the collection of Harberger
taxes. We explore the forms that it might take. In Section 3, we discuss some
practical challenges, including the redistributive implications of the tax; its
4 See Subsection 2.1 for a discussion of the implications of Harberger taxation for the distribution of
income, Gordon (2016), for a discussion of the recent decline in growth and productivity growth,
and Piketty (2014), for a discussion of the rise of inequality within wealthy countries.
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fairness when people have strong attachments to property; how a regime of
“forced sales” may disrupt planning; and how inspections of property can take
place. Then in Section 4, we describe how the Harberger tax might work for
different types of property. Here, we show areas in which implementation of the
Harberger tax would be straightforward (domain names, broadcast spectrum,
natural resource leases), and then address some more complicated cases (cor-
porate acquisitions, real property, personal property). A theme of this section is
that many of the features of the Harberger tax that people might find objec-
tionable already exist in hidden form in the current mixed system. Furthermore,
we argue that several new technologies are making the benefits of Harberger
taxation greater and its optimal rate higher, suggesting that the gains from
implementing such a system will grow in coming years.
Our arguments reach deep into the roots of economic theory. Nineteenth-
century critics of Adam Smith’s theories of the market economy identified
private property as one of the chief culprits in what they saw as wasteful eco-
nomic relationships, as well as systems of domination. While the critics did not
identify the monopoly problem in so many terms, their concerns about private
property—that those who owned it could extract rents from those who did
not—were related to it (Bowles & Edwards 1985, p. 73–83). Many of them—
including Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Owen, Fourier, Marx, and Engels—called
for common ownership of some sort (Gray 1946). Yet they were never clear
about the form that common ownership would take, or how it would address
the incentive problems that preoccupied Smith. Even the leading socialist
economists of the 20th century—Oskar Lange, Abba Lerner, and Fred
Taylor—ignored the problem of implementation, assuming “all that was ne-
cessary was a large calculation” to satisfy the equation of general equilibrium
theory, in other words, central planning (Lange & Taylor 1938; Lerner 1944).
von Mises (1920) and Hayek (1945) pointed out the flaw in this reasoning:
central planners lack the information they need to make allocative decisions
(Bowles 2004).5 People’s valuations are private information; the genius of the
market is its capacity for disseminating this information from consumers to
producers through the price system. The alternative was massive misallocation
of resources—the production of goods no one wanted—that was characteristic
of real-world socialist economies like that of the Soviet Union.6
5 See also Bowles (2004, p. 475–476), for a discussion of the mid-century debates.
6 These critiques would eventually lead modern socialist thinkers to advocate various hybrid eco-
nomic relationships like workers’ cooperatives, which would have placed production under greater
democratic control, and stronger economic rights, which would make workers less dependent on
their employers. See Bowles & Gintis (1986) and Nove (1991).
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Vickrey (1961) showed that a type of common ownership—one in which the
government auctioned use or possessory rights to people—could lead to allo-
cative efficiency. His work helped initiate the literature that became known as
“mechanism design” (Hurwicz & Reiter 2006). Two other economists writing
in the literature—Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983)—finally identified the mon-
opoly problem in a mathematically rigorous fashion, proving that private prop-
erty was inconsistent with allocative efficiency. This work, along with Vickrey’s,
stimulated a search for efficient market mechanisms, and led to the widespread
adoption of auctions for administrative property, especially the radio spectrum
(Milgrom 2004).
However, this literature never addressed the problem of investment effi-
ciency. The notion that common ownership can undermine investment in
property dates at least back to Aristotle’s Politics, but it became a central
theme of the economics literature after Garrett Hardin’s observations about
the neglect of common resources (Hardin 1968). Formal economic analysis by
Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore emphasized the role of prop-
erty rights in encouraging owners to make productive investments (Grossman
& Hart 1986; Hart & Moore 1990). However, these arguments were met with
some skepticism by proponents of the Vickrey and Myerson-Satterthwaite
logic. Milgrom (1987) and Rogerson (1992) argued that to the extent that an
individual’s investment increases only her own use value for a good, a competi-
tive auction provides optimal incentives. Individuals reap the benefits of the
investment exactly to the extent that they end up owning the good in the future,
which is the only case when it is useful to make the investment. However, as Che
& Hausch (1999) argued, most investments benefit future potential owners as
well as the owner who makes the investment. They consider a case when the
investment is purely “cooperative” in that it raises the buyer’s value rather than
that of the seller. In this case, they show that schemes like Vickrey’s perform
very poorly, worse in fact than simple property ownership, in encouraging
investment.
Meanwhile, a parallel literature in law and economics developed. It origi-
nated with Ronald Coase’s classic article, The Problem of Social Cost (1960), in
which he argued that if transaction costs are low, the allocation of property
rights is irrelevant from the standpoint of efficiency, because property will be
transferred from lower valued to higher valued uses through bargaining.7 While
a huge amount of controversy has developed over what exactly Coase meant, it
is clear that in the hands of many subsequent authors beginning with George
7 Some limited empirical work confirms the lawyer’s intuition that bargaining can be extremely
difficult, especially in the sorts of examples that Coase preferred. See Farnsworth (1999).
Spring 2017: Volume 9, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 57
Stigler’s (1966) third edition of The Theory of Price, the “Coase Theorem” came
to stand for the idea that private bargaining from strong and clearly defined
property rights frequently makes regulation unnecessary, particularly when a
small number of people are affected by the externality in question, and hence
transaction costs are low. In the Coasean world of low transaction costs, the
monopoly problem is simply assumed away, which means that private property
is optimal because it enhances investment efficiency.8
This idea has made its way into the literature on the law and economics of
property. The standard view is that private property is “normal” because com-
petitive markets prevent owners from exploiting their formal monopoly power
over their property; public ownership and restrictions on private property (in
the sense of the owner’s power to refuse to alienate the property) are justified in
only exceptional cases involving public goods, spillovers, “natural monopolies”
(typically meaning cases where market power is very high and price distortions
extreme), and assembly problems.9 Probably under the influence of the Coase
theorem, law and economics scholars divide the world into “zero (or low)
transaction cost” and “high transaction cost” and claim that regulation
(including public ownership) is appropriate only in the latter, leaving private
property to prevail in the (implicitly “normal”) zone of the former. But the
monopoly problem is always a matter of degree; because the monopoly problem
is a type of transaction cost, transaction costs are also never zero but instead a
matter of degree. This means that advances in technology and the design of
institutions, including the Harberger tax itself, may shrink the zone in which
private property is superior.
At the same time, scholars writing in the Coasean tradition have understood,
from the very beginning, that the state must play a role in facilitating bargains.
In their influential early article on property rules and liability rules, Calabresi &
Melamed (1972) pointed out that liability rules may be justified when
8 This can be seen in the three major textbooks on law and economics. All three textbooks give great
weight to the investment problem as a justification for private property: if private property did not
exist, then people would not invest in improving property since they could not be sure that they
would profit from the returns on the investment. See Shavell (2004, p. 11–19); Cooter & Ulen (2002,
p. 76–81); Posner (2014, p. 40–42). The textbooks give only passing attention to the monopoly
problem. While they acknowledge that holdout problems, and related problems of strategic behav-
ior, can interfere with the transfer of property, they largely consider these problems as confined to
cases where the use of property affects many people, as in the case of factory pollution.
9 Merrill (2012, p. 91) illustrates this view. After noting that “[a]ll property rights confer a monopoly,”
he says, “[m]onopolies are troubling only when they confer market power.” But monopolies by
definition confer market power. What Merrill probably means is that the monopoly created by
private property is not a matter of public concern because the market power it confers is relatively
limited, which means that expensive antitrust litigation or government regulation will not be
justified.
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bargaining is not possible.10 If pollution from a factory harms thousands of
people, it may not be possible for the victims to pay the factory to stop, as
imagined by Coase. In this case, the courts step in and force a bargain by setting
a price equal to the harm suffered by the residents. Judicial valuation would
remain minimal for two-party cases on the assumption that judicial valuation is
inherently inaccurate, less accurate than the prices set by parties themselves. But
Kaplow & Shavell (1996) later showed that liability rules can be superior to
property rules even for the two-party case when bargaining is possible, if it is
not frictionless.11 If judicial valuation is accurate on average, the benefit from
being able to force a sale exceeds the cost from inaccurate valuation. Segal &
Whinston (2011) amplify this logic by showing that this more efficient fallback
option provides a better basis for bargaining to efficiency. The reason is that the
parties will settle on a price against the background expectation of an on-aver-
age accurate judicial valuation.
However, Segal & Whinston (forthcoming) also show that, unlike shared
property rights, liability rules do not allow full efficiency or eliminate the mon-
opoly problem because judicial valuations, even when accurate on average, are
never as accurate as private valuations are. Furthermore, Kaplow and Shavell
argue that such valuations may not even be accurate on average from the per-
spective of the traders, as they may both have information unavailable to the
court. In this case, they argue that property rules may be superior to liability
rules. Whichever is the case, liability rules leave much to be desired in resolving
the monopoly problem.
In recent years, law and economics scholars have begun to look for inspir-
ation in the mechanism design literature. Ayres & Balkin (1996) propose a
mechanism that replaces liability rules with what they call “truncated auctions”.
A factory, for example, may pollute the property of a neighboring laundry if
(i) the factory offers to pay the laundry its expected loss from the pollution, and
(ii) the laundry declines to exercise a “take-back option” under which it pays an
exercise price of some higher amount. Fennell (2005) proposes a similar mech-
anism except that the factory, when it exercises its initial option to pay, must
also state a price at which the laundry may exercise its option to retake the
entitlement. These and related proposals12 may lessen the monopoly problem
10 See also Cooter (1982) for a broader discussion of the problems with the Coase theorem.
11 Kaplow & Shavell (1996) discuss some suggestions.
12 The literature has ramified into multiple competing proposals along similar lines. See, e.g., Knysh,
Goldbart, & Ayres (2004); Bell & Parchomovsky (2005). All of these proposals share the property
that they may, under some circumstances, improve the efficiency of allocation, but none do so
generally, nor do any of them quantify the protection of investment incentives, or optimally trade off
these two objectives.
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by enabling the buyer to force the monopolist to transact at a price that reflects
the monopolist’s private information about its valuation.
However, these mechanisms share several flaws. First, they all rely to a signifi-
cant extent on judicial valuations and the setting of discretionary prices and
thresholds by third parties that may be poorly informed. This implies that
these mechanisms may harm allocative efficiency in some cases and will tend
to be relatively ineffectual at improving it. Second, to the extent that these mech-
anisms reveal any private information, they do it ex post when much of the
opportunity for supplying countervailing incentives is past and then require
the entitlement taker to assess a valuation on the spot. This is likely to be
more challenging than allowing the entitlement holder, who has held the entitle-
ment for an extended period during which she can reflect on its value, to set the
valuation ex ante. Third, these proposals tend to undermine investment incen-
tives; liability protection of an asset may actually create an incentive to harm
assets in ways that make them less attractive to a prospective taker, unless the
objective assessor can correctly perceive the improved value of the asset.13 Fourth,
many of these mechanisms require the buyer of the asset to be fixed and defined
in advance (and known to the law), which makes them difficult to apply in the
case of most asset markets where the desirable owners of assets emerge dynam-
ically from a large population. Finally, these mechanisms are quite elaborate,
making them difficult to imagine implementing in practice and raising concerns
about their sensitivity to changes in the environment in which they are analyzed.
As we turn to our proposed Harberger tax, we should acknowledge that, for
some readers, it will seem like science fiction, too radical to be taken seriously. But
while some applications of the proposal would change ordinary life in surprising
and possibly discomfiting ways, other applications—for example, to the broadcast
spectrum and natural resource extraction rights—are perfectly ordinary, and only
modestly different from approaches that the government already uses. That said,
we acknowledge that our discussion is exploratory and that only empirical evi-
dence can resolve questions about whether our system would work well or poorly.
1. THEORY
In this section, we discuss the fundamental ideas behind our proposal.14 We
begin by explaining how private ownership interferes with allocative efficiency
13 Fennell’s (2011) scheme does this in an even more extreme way, as it gives the entitlement-taker the
right to make the offer, giving the taker an incentive to extract all benefit from investment from the
entitlement holder.
14 For a more formal treatment, see Weyl & Zhang 2017.
60 ~ Posner and Weyl: Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly
relative to the system of common ownership advocated by Vickrey. Next, we
point out that private ownership generates superior incentives for investment.
In the final two sections, we show how “partial common ownership”—a mixed
version of private and common ownership—optimizes across the two forms of
efficiency, and explain how the Harberger tax fulfills this function.
1.1 Allocative Efficiency
A central economic problem in a variety of settings is that of ensuring capital—
including money, land, machines, and other assets—is allocated to its most
productive uses. In traditional economic models, this problem is assumed away:
capital assets move to their most productive uses because the people or firms
who can use it most productively can pay the highest prices to buy it from those
who cannot. However, in the real world this problem of allocative efficiency
often takes center stage. As Hoffman (1988) famously argued, England may
have industrialized earlier than France and other countries because English law
recognized a type of compulsory purchase, called enclosure. Roughly, enclosure
allowed expropriation of large areas of land on the urban periphery for use in
manufacturing, while no similar system of compulsory purchase existed in
France. In modern times, mergers and takeovers of corporations represent a
large share of aggregate economic activity, nearly half a trillion dollars each
year—and yet they frequently fail because of bargaining impasses (Grossman &
Hart 1980; Jensen & Ruback 1983; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Real estate devel-
opment is also hampered because it requires the assembly of multiple plots of
land whose owners hold out for high prices. The solution is a form of govern-
ment expropriation—takings for “private use”—which has been enormously
controversial (Somin 2009, p. 2108–2114). A final example is the misallocation
of usage rights for the electromagnetic spectrum, which the government has
tried to cure by introducing auctions (Milgrom 2004; Eisenach 2011, p. 88;
Kominers & Weyl 2012; Milgrom & Segal 2015). Hsieh & Klenow (2009) have
argued that the misallocation of capital assets to insufficiently productive uses
can explain an important part of the differentials in output across countries.
The source of misallocation in all these examples is the same: the owner of
private property will “hold out” for a price that the buyer may not be able to
pay, leading to delay or a failed transaction even when the buyer can use the
property more productively than the owner can. This problem was first identi-
fied by Jevons (1871), one of the founders of neo-classical economics. The title
of this article is a quote from his 1879 second edition of his classic, The Theory of
Political Economy. However, this idea takes its sharpest formal manifestation in
the classic analysis of Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983) in the early 1980s, for
which Myerson eventually won the Nobel prize. Myerson and Satterthwaite
Spring 2017: Volume 9, Number 1 ~ Journal of Legal Analysis ~ 61
consider a case in which there is a single current owner and single potential
buyer for an asset. They show that if it is not known with certainty by both
parties that the buyer values that asset more than the seller,15 and that the seller
has an absolute right to refuse to sell if she wishes to, then, assuming both agents
act in their economic self-interest, there exists no procedure for bargaining that
ensures that the good is transferred to the buyer whenever the buyer values the
good more than the seller does, which is what is meant by “allocative
efficiency”.
The idea behind this Myerson–Satterthwaite Theorem is that if, for example,
the seller is asked to make an offer to the buyer, she will typically demand more
than her reservation price for the asset because she wishes to maximize her
profit on the sale. This will lead some buyers who would have been willing to
pay the seller’s reservation value, but are unwilling to pay the price she quotes,
to refuse to purchase. The buyer, however, if asked to make an offer to the seller
will offer less than her reservation price for purchase, again to enjoy more of the
surplus associated with the trade. This will lead some sellers who would have
been willing to sell at the buyer’s reservation price to refuse to sell. Both out-
comes inefficiently reduce the probability that the asset moves from the lower
value user to the higher value user. Any other bargaining protocol involves
some combination of the two sides determining the price, or an outsider
with no knowledge of the correct price determining it, and thus they all lead
to an inefficient reduction in the probability of turnover.
The Myerson–Satterthwaite Theorem would be of only academic interest if
its only implication were that it is theoretically impossible to achieve efficient
allocation of assets under normal economic conditions. On this view, a dead-
weight cost in every transaction is the price of living in a market economy.
However, Vickrey (1961) showed that if a good is owned by a whole community
of individuals, with equal shares of its rental value being divided among all, the
efficient allocation of the asset at any period can be achieved by a simple system
of competitive bidding. In the most familiar version of the idea, property is
owned in common—and hence managed by the government. The government
distributes the right to possess, use, or control property for temporary periods
by conducting an English auction, in which the price of the good rises until only
one bidder remains. Because the price paid by this bidder conditional on win-
ning the auction is independent of her decision to remain in the auction, she
has an incentive to stay in if, and only if, the current price is below her reser-
vation price. This ensures that the winner of the auction is the individual with
the greatest reservation price and thus that the asset is allocated efficiently.
15 In other words, if information is asymmetric.
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Imagine, to take a concrete example, that the government owns apartment
blocks and auctions off one-year leases to the apartments. Every year, everyone
would enter the auction, and the apartments would be reallocated to the people
who value them the most. We call this system the “Vickrey Commons”.
Why does a Vickrey Commons achieve allocative efficiency when private
ownership does not? The fundamental reason is competition: under Vickrey’s
system, all individuals are on even footing; each must outbid the other to
achieve control. In contrast, under private ownership the current owner has a
monopoly right to retain the good unless she finds it sufficiently profitable to
transfer the good to another. This fundamental asymmetry gives her an interest
in holding out for a profit while a participant in a Vickrey auction lacks the
ability to hold out in this way. In this sense, there is a fundamental tension
between two concepts commonly aligned with each other: privately owned
property and free competition.
The monopoly problem is most serious when property is illiquid, which
typically arises when property is idiosyncratic. Such property is hard to value
because it cannot be easily compared to other pieces of property. Thus, it takes a
long time for people to agree on a price, if they agree at all, and in the process
much effort may be wasted. Artwork is highly illiquid; houses are illiquid; pork
bellies and ball bearings are liquid.
1.2 Investment Efficiency
The Vickrey Commons has a flaw: it does not give people an incentive to take
care of, or invest in, the assets under their control.16 If a person wishes to retain
an asset, she must outbid other potential buyers whenever the asset is returned to
the Commons and put up for bid again. This means that if she increases the value
of the assets through a private investment, she will be required to pay a higher
price to retain it—and that extra amount will offset the increase in value, ensur-
ing that she obtain no return on her investment. Indeed, people do not even have
an incentive to invest in maintenance of a good to the extent that the investment
maintains the value of the good beyond the next auction. This concern has been
almost entirely neglected, to our knowledge, before the work of Weyl & Zhang
(2017) in the literature on mechanisms to improve allocative efficiency.
16 Interestingly, the Vickrey Commons, and the systems of common ownership we advocate below, do
provide efficient incentives for individuals to make a narrower kind of selfish investment, one aug-
menting only their own idiosyncratic personal value for the asset and not its objective capital value.
Individuals make efficient selfish investments in the Vickrey commons because in situations where
they expect to win the auction they capture the full value of these investments, while in situations
where they expect to lose the auction, and thus such investments have no value as they will be wasted
once a more efficient owner takes over the asset, they do not benefit from them. See Subsection 3.2
below for more detail.
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In our example of the apartments, consider the incentive of someone who
leases an apartment. The person would like to give the walls a coat of fresh
paint. If she does so, the apartment will be worth more both for her and for
other potential tenants when the next auction is held. This means that she will
need to raise her bid to retain the apartment, or otherwise allow someone else to
enjoy the benefit of the new paint job. Yet, she incurs the full cost of the
painting. Because she internalizes the costs of any investment she makes in
the apartment, but not all the benefit of those investments, her incentive is to
neglect the apartment.
By contrast, private property provides optimal incentives for such capital
investments because any increase in the value of the asset to both the seller
and the potential buyer is perfectly captured by the seller. The owner of an
apartment benefits from the fresh coat of paint if she remains in the apartment
or, if she sells it, via the price premium that the buyer pays in return for an
apartment with new paint. Private property rights enable the owner to capture
the return on her investment by charging an increased price. Note, however,
that this only provides optimal incentives to the current possessor of the asset. If
other individuals, in the community, the government or the nation in which the
possessor resides may influence the value of the asset, it will not typically be
optimal even from an investment perspective for the possessor to own the full
value of the asset as shown by Ho¨lmstrom (1982) in his classic study of incen-
tives in teams. We will return to the advantages of Harberger taxation in such
settings in Subsection 2.1 further.
In sum, while common ownership allows for efficient allocation, private
ownership optimizes incentives for capital investment by the present possessor.
1.3 The Case for Partial Common Ownership
A possible response to the argument so far is that private property rights should
be used for property where investment incentives are more important than al-
locative efficiency, and that common property should be used where allocative
efficiency is more important than investment efficiency. However, there is a third
possibility: “partial” common ownership, where allocative efficiency and invest-
ment efficiency are optimized within a single property regime. This possibility
is illustrated by an ingenious proposal of Cramton, Gibbons, & Klemperer
(1987) in the late 1980s, and elaborated upon by Segal & Whinston (2011).17
17 These ideas have been pursued in the law and economics literature as well; see, e.g., Landeo & Spier
(2014a,b).
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The basic idea is that by sharing ownership one can deter the exercise of mon-
opoly power.
Consider a partnership of two individuals who no longer wish to work to-
gether and seek to dissolve it. Each person submits a bid for the value of the
company and the higher bid wins. Whoever wins must buy out the share of the
other partner at the average of the two prices. To see how this system gives each
partner at least some incentive to be truthful, imagine first the case where the
current shares align precisely with the chance that each partner wins. Here, each
party has an incentive to bid precisely her reservation value. Suppose that
partner A has a 60 percent ownership and anticipates, she will win the bidding
process with 60 percent probability. If she raises her bid beyond some level, this
increases the amount she must pay with probability 60 percent, but the amount
applies to only 40 percent of the total value of the firm as this is the fraction she
must buy from her partner. On the contrary, her higher bid also raises the
amount she is paid if she loses the auction, which occurs with 40 percent
probability but applies to the 60 percent she owns. These two incentives exactly
balance and thus she has no incentive to try to manipulate the prices and
instead simply bids her reservation value. Even if the shares do not perfectly
line up with the chances of each party winning, any degree of shared ownership
will dampen the incentive of each partner to exaggerate or understate her value
by forcing her to confront the countervailing incentive she faces if she ends up
on the opposite side of the deal to the one she anticipated.
An important advantage of this system over the Vickrey Commons, first
noted by Weyl & Zhang (2017), is that it preserves investment incentives to
some extent. An individual with a 90 percent ownership stake in a partnership
still has 90 percent of the incentive to invest that an individual with a 100
percent stake does. If she ends up winning the bidding process, she retains
the good (and thus the investment) and must pay only 10 percent of it to
her partner for the right to enjoy this value. If she loses the process, her partner
pays her 90 percent of the value of the investment to settle. Thus, while the
Vickrey Commons gives no one any incentive to invest in the asset, partial
common ownership gives all individuals an incentive to invest in proportion
to their ownership shares.
Shared ownership is a promising way to organize a partnership. However, the
scheme that we described works only for partnerships, a relatively unusual form
of ownership. More commonly, the potential purchaser of an asset, such as
spectrum or a house, is not known at the time at which the property rights over
that asset are established; this purchaser is only revealed perhaps years later
when she enters the market for an asset of that sort. Clearly, sharing property
rights with a specific potential purchaser is infeasible in such a case as there are
many members of the public at large who could end up being this potential
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purchaser.18 In the next section, we describe how the logic behind shared own-
ership can be applied to such cases.19
1.4 The Harberger Tax
The economist Arnold Harberger proposed a simple property tax that was
designed to raise revenue in developing countries where institutional capacity
was weak. The key to the tax was that property owners were required to “self-
assess”—to announce periodically how much they valued their property and
pay taxes on the basis of the announced valuation—while being required to sell
the property at the self-assessed property if anyone wanted to buy it (Harberger
1965). Tideman (1969) and Levmore (1982) subsequently embellished upon the
idea. While they (especially Harberger and Levmore) saw this procedure pri-
marily as a revenue raising mechanism, the Harberger “tax” also constitutes a
new kind of private property, a system of partial common ownership that
provides incentives closely related to those highlighted by Cramton, Gibbons,
Klemperer, Segal, and Whinston.
Under this system, there would be a registry of all assets owned by individ-
uals, which we henceforth refer to as the cadaster and anthropomorphize as the
enforcer of all the rules of the system.20 Individuals would list all their
18 Note, however, that just because there are many potential purchasers at the time at which the property
rights are established, this does not imply that there are many competitors to purchase at the time the
potential purchaser arrives. This is true for many if not most business and property transactions: at
the time one buys one’s house, one typically has no idea who might buy it in the future. However, by
the time one is about to conclude a sale, there are usually only one or two plausible purchasers
interested in buying it. Thus, a thin market at the point of sale does not imply that the buyer is
known at the point of property right design. It is this dynamic evolution of the potential purchaser
pool that makes sharing property rights with the public at large, rather than with a specific potential
purchaser, both necessary and desirable.
19 In fact, in the case when there is only a single plausible purchaser of the asset, Harberger taxation
may end up operating somewhat differently from how we describe it below: the potential purchaser
and the possessor will typically have an incentive to collude to allow the possessor to lower her
valuation to avoid tax payments, while the potential purchaser agrees that, if she ever does purchase,
she will do so at higher price in exchange for a portion of the taxes thus saved. While such a scheme is
unstable in many ways (there is always a temptation for the purchaser to simply take the property at
the newly lowered valuation, especially given that such collusion could be viewed as illegal), it does
not defeat the value of Harbrerger taxation relative to full ownership because the shadow of
Harberger taxation still enhances the bargaining over the sale and thus reallocation of the asset.
Thus, while some extreme and fragile forms of bargaining may undermine the revenue raised by
Harberger taxation if enforcement against collusion is lax, Harberger taxation still very likely im-
proves allocative efficiency, its primary objective.
20 Of course, a cadaster is inanimate and in many implementations it would be cadastral authorities
that would implement the system. However, we choose to view the cadaster itself as an agent
because, as we discuss below, our system does not require any discretionary authority and could
be implemented using, for example, an algorithm or a distributed/decentralized blockchain to avoid
the possibility of the system being abused. As such we prefer to think of the system as either being
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possessions in the cadaster with a self-assessed value assigned to them. This self-
assessed value would serve two purposes, corresponding to the events of sale
and purchase in the Cramton–Gibbons–Klemperer scheme (1987). On the one
hand, the owner would be required to sell any asset at the value listed in the
cadaster to any buyer willing to pay this price. On the other hand, the owner
would pay a tax on the asset at a specified rate.
To see how this tax serves a role like the shared ownership system highlighted
by Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, suppose that the annual Harberger tax
rate is set equal to the probability that a buyer who values the asset more than
the seller materializes in each period. (We call this probability the “turnover
rate”, meaning the rate at which the asset moves into another person’s hands.)
Suppose that the tax rate and the turnover rate are both 30 percent. If the owner
raises her sale price above her reservation value, she benefits from the higher
sale price 30 percent of the time—when those higher value buyers turn up. Her
benefit from raising the price would thus be :3P, where P is the increment in
the sale price. On the contrary, she must pay the tax of 30 percent which,
applied to this incremental value, forces her to pay an additional :3P. Thus,
the benefit from increasing the price above the reservation price is exactly offset
by the cost. The seller also wants to ensure that the asset is not taken from her at
less than she is willing to accept for it. She thus will set a price exactly equal to
her reservation value, ensuring that exactly the buyers willing to pay more than
her reservation value will end up taking the asset. Full allocative efficiency is
achieved.21
itself the enforcement agent or as an impersonal agent of the broader community rather than vesting
any power in central authorities who might abuse or manipulate it, given that our goal is precisely to
circumvent the reliance of past systems on arbitrary centralized judicial discretion.
21 Note that this argument fails if the owner’s value for the asset is also uncertain, as no tax rate can ever
perfectly achieve a turnover rate equal to the efficient turnover rate, as the latter depends on the ex
hypothesi unknown owner value. Cramton Gibbons & Klemperer (1987) and Segal & Whinston
(2011) show that if other bargaining procedures (other than the seller making a take-it-or-leave-it
offer) are used and the property rights are shared with the potential purchaser rather than with
society at large, full efficiency can be achieved if and only if the fraction of property rights held by the
owner equals the turnover rate conditional on the information known to the potential purchaser.
Because property rights are not shared with the purchaser under Harberger taxation it is unlikely
this full efficiency could be achieved, but it does seem probable that Coasean bargaining in the
shadow of Harberger taxation will achieve superior outcomes even to those directly yielded by
Harberger taxation with purchases based on the posted price. Furthermore, it is very likely that
outcomes conditional on Coasean bargaining will be improved by the more efficient fallback pos-
ition created by Harberger taxation. See Farrell (1987); Ayres & Talley (1995); Kaplow & Shavell
(1996); and Segal & Whinston (2014) for arguments that Coasean bargaining, while it improves over
fallback positions, achieves greater welfare when the fall back is more efficient. However, we have not
formally analyzed such bargaining in the shadow of Harberger taxation, partially because it is highly
sensitive to the bargaining procedure chosen; this is an interesting direction for future research.
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What of investment efficiency? Suppose that the asset (which, for the sake of
simplicity, let us suppose lasts only this year) is currently worth $100,000 to her
and that by investing $75,000 she can increase its value to $200,000 to her, but
also increase the value that any potential future buyer will place on it by
$100,000 as well. Because the turnover rate has not changed, our logic above
indicates that she will, after the investment, list the property in the cadaster at a
value of $200,000. However, this increases her tax bill by $30,000. Thus, even
though the value she gains from the asset regardless of whether the buyer ac-
quires it has now increased by $100,000, she is forced to pay $30,000 of this to
the cadaster. It will not be worth it, therefore, for her to make the investment of
$75,000 despite this being in the social interest.
But we can improve investment efficiency by adjusting the Harberger tax. If a
lower tax rate were charged, say 10 percent, then the owner would still be able to
capture $90,000 of the benefit from the investment. This greatly improves her
incentive to invest. Of course, if the Harberger tax is reduced below the turn-
over rate, the owner will charge a price above her reservation value. By increas-
ing the price beginning at her reservation value she could still capture :3P of
value from a potential buyer, but she would now be forced to pay only :1P to
the tax authority. She would thus have an incentive to raise the price.
It might be thought that the loss in allocative efficiency would offset the gain
in investment efficiency but—and this is a key point—the truth is the opposite.
When the Harberger tax is reduced incrementally to improve investment effi-
ciency, the loss in allocative efficiency is less than the gain in investment effi-
ciency. The reason is that the most valuable sales are ones where the buyer is
willing to pay significantly more than the seller is willing to accept. These
transactions are the first ones enabled by a reduction in the price. In fact, it
can be shown, using standard economic reasoning, that the size of the social loss
from monopoly power grows quadratically in the extent of this power. Thus,
reducing the markup by a third eliminates close to 5
9
¼ 3222
32
of the allocative
harm from private ownership. Furthermore, in this example the distortion to
investment is eliminated. More generally, if we considered all scenarios in which
an investment could raise the value of the asset to $100,000, the only invest-
ments that would be deterred by a 10 percent tax are those that cost more than
$90,000 to make. These investments are both rare and not terribly valuable, as
the net value they create is small. By the same reasoning as above, it can thus be
shown that only roughly one-ninth of the total distortion to investment from
the 30 percent tax is caused by a 10 percent tax. Such a policy achieves five-
ninths of the allocative benefit of the 30 percent tax at only one-ninth of its cost
to investment (Weyl & Zhang 2017, p. 8–9).
Because of this quadratic structure, it is always optimal to have at least a very
small Harberger tax. For example, a 1 percent tax will hardly distort investment
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at all but can still significantly improve allocative incentives. The owner will
self-assess with reasonable accuracy to minimize her tax bill, but she will not be
deterred from making valuable investments in the property. It is thus typically
optimal to set a moderate tax rate, significantly below turnover rate, that bal-
ances these two forces. Weyl & Zhang (2017, p. 3, 19) argue that a 2.5 percent
annual rate is likely to be nearly optimal on this basis for a wide range of assets,
like factories, natural resources, and houses, where investment plays a signifi-
cant role but allocation can also be seriously distorted.22
We call the Harberger tax an element in a system of partial common owner-
ship because the people who possess assets are not owners of private property in
the traditional sense. The two most important “sticks” in the bundle of rights
that compose private property are the “right to use” and the “right to exclude”
(see Merrill 1998). In the Harberger system, both rights are partly transferred
from the possessor to the public at large.
First, take the right to use. Under strict private property, all benefits from use
accrue to the owner. Under the Harberger system, on the contrary, a fraction of
this use value is revealed and transferred to the public through the tax; the
higher the tax, the greater the fraction of use value transferred. Weyl and Zhang
calculate that a 2.5 percent tax would transfer about a third of use value to the
public. Second, consider the right to exclude. In the Harberger system, the
“owner” does not enjoy this right vis-a`-vis anyone who offers to buy at the
self-assessed price. In fact, any member of the public may exclude the current
owner in exchange for this price. The lower the price, therefore, the greater is
the extent to which the exclusion right is held by the public at large rather than
the “owner”. Because the price falls as the tax rises, raising the Harberger tax
also shifts the exclusion right to the public at large.
Therefore, we can conceptualize the Harberger system as one in which own-
ership is shared between the “public” or “society” and the possessor. People are
not so much owners of property as “lessees” from society, subject to a special
kind of lease that terminates when a higher value user appears, whereupon the
lease is automatically transferred to that user. Yet, our system is far from
centralized planning. The government does not set prices, allocate resources,
or assign people jobs: it plays no role, except to mechanically administer a
system of property rights. Indeed, as we will argue further, the government’s
role would be more limited than it is today because there is no need for dis-
cretionary interventions to solve holdout and other monopoly-related
22 However, as we discuss below, optimal rates will vary across asset classes. How much and how finely
they vary is an interesting design question that trades off complexity with optimality, and we turn to
this in the next section.
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problems an much less need for distortionary and discretionary government
taxes to raise revenue for the state.
Before we continue, we should note that Harberger taxation is not the “op-
timal mechanism” in the sense of the literature on mechanism design.23 It
typically does not achieve full allocative efficiency and certainly may not be
optimized to tradeoff investment and allocative efficiency. Optimal mechan-
isms are often quite elaborate and finely tuned to environmental details that
require detailed knowledge and discretion on the part of the designer. The spirit
of Harberger taxation is precisely to limit this discretion and create a system
that is self enforcing beyond a single tax rate, that can be largely set based upon
the observable turnover rate of assets as we discuss in the next section. However,
it is notable that Weyl and Zhang find that such a simple system can achieve
most of the first-best welfare gains relative to the status quo: in most calibra-
tions Harberger taxation achieves 70 to 90 percent of the maximum possible
allocative welfare gains and the investment losses erode only 10 to 20 percent of
these gains.24
2. DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY
While the theory underlying the Harberger tax as developed by Weyl and Zhang
is simple, putting the theory into practice would face some significant chal-
lenges. In this section, we discuss how some of these challenges can be overcome
though institutional design and application of advances in information
technology.
2.1 Use of Revenue
Harberger taxation, if implemented at anything like the breadth we suggest, is
likely to raise a large pool of revenue, in the range of a third to two-thirds of the
return on capital (defined as payments to all nonlabor factors of production) or
roughly 10 to 20 percent of national income in most developed countries. In
considering how this revenue should be allocated, four considerations are es-
pecially salient. First, revenue may be used to offset the distributive effects of the
tax by compensating the owners thus expropriated. Second, revenue may be
23 At least since the work of Wilson (1987) mechanism design in economics has moved away from the
design of optimal mechanisms and towards the identification of simple mechanisms that are ro-
bustly approximately efficient, to avoid fragility and over-fitting, problems formalized in the stat-
istical learning literature by Blumer et al. (1987). See Hartline (2016) for a survey of this approach.
24 Furthermore, as discussed in footnote 22 above, Coasean bargaining in the shadow of Harberger
taxation may allow for even greater gains. Modeling the outcome of such bargaining is beyond our
scope here, however.
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distributed in a manner intended to encourage investments in the value
of capital and thus to offset or compensate for the distortion to investment
efficiency the tax creates. Third, the revenue may be used to reduce existing
inefficiencies by reducing or eliminating other distortionary taxes or
providing for public goods. Finally, the revenue might be used to address
existing social inequities or injustices that other theories of capital taxation
aim at alleviating.
Many potential uses of revenue could kill many birds with one stone. For
example, using some revenue from the Harberger tax to reduce distortionary
existing capital taxes would encourage investment in a manner that offsets the
investment reducing effect of the Harberger tax and would (thereby) offset
existing distortionary taxes. At an opposite extreme, using the revenue to
fund public goods (at local, regional, or national levels) would nonetheless
have a similar logic, as Arnott & Stiglitz (1979) argue, building on the work
of Henry George. Public goods play an important role in influencing the value
of capital; using Harberger tax revenue to fund public goods not only offsets the
undersupply of public goods resulting from the distortionary nature of public
good funding, but also provides incentives to local authorities to efficiently
provide public goods (viz. invest in capital value). Such public goods may
also alleviate inequality in some circumstances.
A more radical use of revenue from a Harberger tax would be to supply a
universal basic income. Such a grant would more directly socialize the owner-
ship of capital in the sense that individuals within a community would more
directly perceive themselves as receiving an income from the capital of the
community. Many economists and political philosophers have called for
using capital taxes of various sorts to finance a universal basic income in
recent years to remedy the injustices of inequality (Piketty 2014; Van Parijs
and Vanderborght, 2017). It might seem that this type of distribution is the only
benefit of using the revenue in this manner. However, we believe that such a use
would also have important benefits from an investment perspective, if correctly
structured. Many individuals other than the current possessor of capital goods
influence their value. Neighbors’ investment in their properties influence the
value of the properties of their neighbors. Workers at firms influence the value
of the firm’s capital (and are thus often compensated partly in equity). Voters
help determine policies and the economic climate that affect returns on capital;
unless such voters have a share in the capital stock they may vote for leaders
whose plans are destructive of the capital stock, as suggested by the recent rise of
populist movements.
In fact, Bengt Ho¨lmstrom’s theory of “Moral Hazard in Teams” (1982) sug-
gests that, to maximize capital investments, revenue should be divided among
individuals in proportion to the elasticity with which their effort can lead to
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increases in capital value. It seems very unlikely that the possessor is the only
such individual or is infinitely more elastic in her investment than are other
individuals or governments. This suggests that the argument we make above,
that investment efficiency is maximized by private ownership, significantly
understates the value of Harberger taxation, which may increase overall invest-
ment by allowing a more efficient sharing of capital rents than is realized under
currently imperfect or incomplete contracts created by the difficulty of assessing
and privately enforcing sharing of capital value.
It seems likely that the revenue raised by Harberger taxation will have ancil-
lary benefits beyond the allocative efficiency improvements it induces. This
suggests that rates should be significantly greater than suggested by the
simple trading off allocative and investment efficiency. This suggests that op-
timal Harberger tax rates, all things considered, are likely close to allocatively
optimal rates and thus to empirically observed turnover rates, which Weyl and
Zhang find to be roughly 7 percent annually on business assets. Such a tax
would collect about 60 percent of capital income in taxes.
2.2 Rate Structure
Weyl and Zhang show that the optimal Harberger tax depends on two factors:
investment and allocation. When the value of property depends heavily on
investment by the possessor that cannot be independently verified by the cada-
ster, then the Harberger tax should be relatively low. When the monopoly
problem is most significant, the Harberger tax should be relatively high—what-
ever the natural turnover rate for the asset is. The monopoly problem tends to
be large when the asset turns over frequently (so that there is a large market for
monopoly to distort), values are widely dispersed among purchasers (so that
the monopoly distortion can cause a lot of waste), values have a smooth uni-
modal distribution among possessors (so that a uniform tax rate is appropri-
ate), and the asset is complementary with other assets, implying that monopoly
power can be compounded by the leverage of the potential purchaser having
already bought complementary properties. The monopoly problem is small in
the reverse circumstances. The table below summarizes the tradeoffs.
Factors calling for high tax Factors calling for a low tax
Frequent asset turnover High sensitivity to investment/conservation
Widely dispersed valuations of asset Value to owner consistently grows
with time possessed
Potentially complementary with other assets Value of owners are multi-modal
(high unless one “needs to move”)
Smooth decay in asset values for owner Many close substitutes available
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These factors differ across assets. In the case of investment efficiency, the
value of some assets is more sensitive to investment than the value of other
assets. Many everyday objects (books, pieces of furniture, watches, laptops, ball
bearings, and construction material) and business assets (land in city centers,
radio spectrum, and durable art works) retain their value with very modest
maintenance or none; many objects (perhaps most of personal value) do not
increase in value very much if one invests in them, and so people do not bother
to. Some personal goods, like automobiles, and most business assets (such as
machines, roads, factories, and computers), are subject to routine maintenance
schedules that reduce the rate of depreciation or require prudence to avoid
excessive exploitation (e.g., fisheries, woodlands, oil fields, etc.). On the con-
trary, rare antique cars, gardens, and delicate textiles in the personal sphere and
corporate reputations, the most advanced machinery and much intellectual
property, require constant care to maintain and improve. Holding constant
allocative efficiency, the Harberger tax should be lower for the latter goods
than for the former.
As for allocative efficiency, this problem is subtler and thus warrants a more
detailed discussion. We focus on four factors: the (optimal) frequency of turn-
over, the spread of values among purchasers, the spread of values among pos-
sessors, and the extent to which the asset is a complement with or a substitute
for other goods.
Goods that (should) turnover frequently should have higher taxes. There is
more to be lost through distorting these goods’ reallocation. Some assets—
family heirlooms in the personal case and brand names in the corporate
case—efficiently should stick with their possessors for long stretches of time.
There is little social benefit to placing Harberger taxes on these goods and rates
should thus be low. Other assets—gadgets in the personal case, spectrum and
high tech equipment in the business case—experience frequent fluctuations in
who should be the owner as tastes and productive uses for them change quickly
with the advance of technology. Harberger taxes should be high on such assets.
Some assets have very similar values to all potential possessors. High grade
corporate bonds, standard issue microwave ovens, cleaning supplies—these are
all assets that will have a definite and fixed value to almost any possessor. They
thus are poor targets for Harberger taxation and call for low rates. Other assets
are unique and have wildly dispersed values. Rare paintings, antiquities,
custom-made clothes, specialized machinery, a uniquely situated piece of
land or spectrum, and exclusive licenses to operate a public utility will have
widely dispersed values across potential purchasers and thus may be subject to
extreme market power. Automobiles and most commercial and residential real
estate fall in the middle. In very illiquid markets, Harberger taxes—holding
constant investment distortion—should approximate the optimal turnover rate
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that results from setting the tax rate equal to the turnover rate until the two
converge.
Some assets have widely dispersed, even multi-modal, values among current
possessors. Family heirlooms are almost priceless—until inherited by an heir
who does not care for them; a statue of the CEO of a company may never be
worth selling—until the CEO is deposed. These assets have values that are
multi-modal and jump around over time. They are not good targets for
Harberger taxation as a uniform tax rate does a poor job matching the distri-
bution of optimal tax rates for these assets. Low tax rates are thus desirable.
Other assets, we would argue most, have a relatively smooth and smoothly
decaying value distribution among current possessors. We tire of many gadgets,
artworks, articles of clothing, and piece of furniture we have had too long;
businesses lose their edge in exploiting natural resources or managing oper-
ations. These assets are good targets for Harberger taxation and call for high tax
rates.
Finally, many assets have close substitutes that limit monopoly power.
Standard and ubiquitous equipment, commodities, and financial assets are
highly liquid and easily substitutable. Harberger taxes on these should be
low, though many of them also require no investment so Harberger taxation
does little harm. Other assets are not only hard to find substitutes for, but also
are highly and uniquely complementary with other assets, exacerbating the
harms of market power. Urban land is often most useful when it can be recon-
figured, similar issues arise in spectrum as we discuss further, artworks may be
most valuable as part of a collection, and season passes are most valuable if next
to each other. In these cases, Harberger taxes can reduce or eliminate the sort of
massive inefficiencies that usually call for solutions like eminent domain and
thus are highly desirable, and should be charged at high rates.
This variation suggests that setting the same tax rate across all assets will yield
a suboptimal result and Weyl & Zhang (2017) prove this is true. While a 2.5
percent rate may be roughly optimal when only trading off investment and
allocative efficiency and a 7 percent rate when all things are considered (as
discussed in the previous subsection) if distinctions are not made between
property types, substantial welfare gains can be achieved by tailoring taxes
more closely to the relevant type of property.
While finer targeting of tax rates improves efficiency, there are some import-
ant concerns in targeting tax rates too finely. First and most worrisome is the
possibility that the category into which property is placed may be manipulated
by owners to minimize their tax liability. Second, excessively fine targeting will
reduce the sample size available to measure the turnover rate and thus may lead
to biased estimates or, more problematically, may encourage individuals to
raise their reported value to depress turnover and thereby lower the tax rate.
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Finally, excessively fine targeting may make it overly complicated for individ-
uals to keep track of their tax liability or for the cadaster to choose a whole
panoply of tax rates.
In the near term, therefore, we would advocate a relatively coarse system with
a small number of easily distinguishable categories such as natural resources,
equipment, real estate, corporate securities, general personal property, keep-
sakes, and heirlooms (which have a low optimal turnover rate and, therefore,
should face a low tax, with some verification to justify placing a good into this
category). Such distinctions are commonly made for the purposes of property
insurance, and thus it does not seem administratively burdensome to enforce a
system of valuation corresponding to these categories. Furthermore, to limit
discretion, we would be inclined to support rates within these categories being
set per a coarse and easily auditable heuristic, such as the currently observed
turnover rate or some proportion to this. Such a system would obviously be
very crude, but in the near term a relatively simple and uniform schedule seems
most practical and probably should be phased in beginning with low rates. In
the longer term, advances in information technology—including machine
learning techniques—may allow for finer gradations.
2.3 Bundling and Quantity Surcharges
Our discussion so far concerns individual assets owned by a person in isolation.
Individuals own many different assets. If the value of an asset to its owner is
independent of other assets that the person owns, our analysis is unaffected.
However, when assets are complementary with or substitutable for one another
to a significant extent, a system that does not account for these relationships will
be inefficient.
Two cases, one of substitutes and one of complements, serve to illustrate the
problem. First, consider the complements case. Suppose that a person owns
three pieces of a triptych. Each component is individually worth a million
dollars to her, but if she owns all three, the components are jointly worth
$10 million to her. If forced to assign a value separately to each part, she
would have to put a value of at least $9 million on each, as this would reflect
the value of any component being taken away from her. However, if the owner
did this, a potential buyer who values the triptych at $11 million—more than
the owner—would not buy it. The price of $27 million deters an efficient sale.25
25 The buyer could try to buy the pieces sequentially—the first for $9 million, then the other two for $1
million each—but this would leave the buyer exposed to the monopoly power of the current owner,
who would know that once the first piece was purchased that she could, with high probability,
extract at least $10 million for the additional two pieces, thus leaving the buyer taking a loss on the
whole purchase. A Harberger tax would not much dampen this latter effect, as the owner would
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Moreover, the owner would end up paying a tax reflecting a $27 million valu-
ation rather than a $9 million valuation, and so instead she would lower the
price. But then someone with lower valuation, say $5 million, might buy the
triptych—again, an inefficient sale. Thus, the inability of individuals to express
complementarities across goods could seriously undermine the efficacy of a
Harberger tax regime.
Now consider the case of substitutes. Suppose that an individual owns the
two remaining bottles of a rare wine vintage. She is willing to part with either of
these two bottles at a price of $10,000, but it is important to her to retain at least
one of them and she would require $100,000 to be willing to give up the second
bottle if she has already sold the first. Again, inefficiencies will arise if she cannot
express this type of valuation. If she is forced to put a value on the two bottles
separately, she will be afraid if she puts the price too low that both bottles will be
taken (simultaneously). But if she sets a high price, she will again be forced to
pay an unfairly high tax and she will discourage an efficient sale of a single bottle
to a potential owner.
Fortunately, there are ways to deal with each of these problems. First, con-
sider the problem of complementarity. The seller could list only the entirety of
the triptych in the cadaster and include no listing for each of the components
separately, at a price near or somewhat above $10 million. This would ensure
that only a purchaser willing to disrupt this full value would purchase it from
her. If this purchaser viewed the components as strong substitutes—meaning
that she values one just as much as two—she could sell one of the components
back to the owner at the low price of $1 million. More broadly, individuals
would have the freedom under our regime to package together or apart any
property they owned. While individuals would be required to list all their
property in the cadaster in some form if they wanted it protected, they could
divide these assets within the cadaster in any way they wanted. Only property
that was not covered by some cadastral valuation could be taken “for free”. At
one extreme, an individual could list her full estate as a single, indivisible unit,
and assess a value on it. This would be highly risky if an individual undervalued
this estate, however, because a raider could take everything she has and then sell
off the components separately. It would also be unprofitable if an individual
valued the estate appropriately as it would reduce the individual’s chance to
profit on sales of individual items. Weyl and Zhang show that for tax rates
below the turnover rate, owners will still assess prices above their personal
values and thus will want as many sales as possible to take place.
know that once the first unit was purchased the buyer would be highly likely, much more likely than
the tax rate would reflect, to try for the other two pieces.
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Thus, in practice individuals would choose to only list as bundled together
goods that could not be separated except at great loss. This would also give a
natural way to deal with goods being combined or repurposed; while a carpen-
ter might start by reporting a pile of wood as her possession, after building a
piece of furniture the wood would be dropped from the cadaster and the piece
of furniture (combining many pieces of wood) would take its place. This could
allow for substantial flexibility along many dimensions.
For the case of substitutes, the problem is less one of packaging than of being
able to express nonlinear surcharges for purchases of multiple goods. This could
be implemented by allowing the individual to list in the cadaster nonadditive
prices on subsets of goods. The wine owner we described above could state a
value of, say, $15,000 for the first bottle of the two purchased but a price of
$120,000 for the purchase of both bottles. The individual would then pay the tax
rate on the total value of the two bottles, $120,000. If the one bottle is sold, the
price of the remaining bottle changes to $105,000 and for the rest of the time the
owner possessed that bottle she would be taxed on a basis of $105,000. While
such a system is perhaps a bit more cumbersome that the packaging system, we
expect it to be employed less frequently given that strong substitutabilities such
as this are less common and even when they occur it is not very frequent that a
purchaser would wish to take all units rather than a subset at one time.
Nonetheless, it should not be too difficult to allow individuals to express
such nonlinear schedules in cases where they are important.
Obviously, these two cases, of pure complements and pure substitutes, do not
represent the set of all possible interactions of values across goods. But for the
present, allowing for these basic forms of complementarity and substitutability
seems to cover the greatest potential inefficiencies that could occur and those
likely to occur most frequently.
2.4 User Interface
The efficacy of a system like the one we propose here would depend as much on
how easily and seamlessly it is presented to users as on the fundamental incen-
tives it embodies. There are two sides to the presentation of our proposed
cadaster: how it appears to current owners, and how it appears to potential
buyers.
Current owners would have to report values with some frequency for all their
possessions, presenting a tradeoff between convenience and accuracy. If they
must report self-assessed valuations frequently, they must undergo the trouble
of thinking about how much they value something and of recording the valu-
ation, but if they report infrequently, then valuations will become inaccurate as
tastes and budgets change. One approach would be for taxes to accrue in
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continuous time based on an annualized tax rate, with individuals having the
right to change their valuations at any point in time. This system could be
managed through a web interface accessible, for example, by a smartphone
application or a web browser. A well-designed interface would likely automat-
ically retrieve information from tracking devices of the sort associated with the
“Internet of Things” (Atzori et al. 2010) to help the owner keep track of her
possessions. It would be linked to her methods of electronic payment, so that
her purchases would automatically be added to the cadaster, at which point she
would be asked to assign a value to them.
While some individuals and many businesses would want to carefully weigh
each valuation, a sensible system would allow for plugins from third parties,
that would offer advice to participants about valuing goods, or default valu-
ations, in an automated way using collaborative filtering and other techniques
that form the basis of the ubiquitous recommendation engines. When an owner
begins to tire of a piece of property, rather than undertaking large expenses to
market and sell the property, she could just begin to lower its price on the
cadaster, and eventually someone would take the property from her. Indeed, she
could use a program that gradually reduced the price until a sale took place, in
effect, conducting a Dutch auction, with the rate of reduction reflecting the
owner’s reservation price, liquidity needs, and the prices of other comparable
goods in the market.
Tradeoffs would have to be struck between allowing individuals to express a
rich range of packaging of goods or substitution patterns and allowing the most
common expressions to be made in a seamless and easy way. The details are
beyond the scope of this article, but a topic for future work.
On the buyers’ side, a well-designed technology offers significant potential
for changing the nature of electronic commerce. A few possibilities that a prop-
erly designed system could permit are:
(i) A real estate developer interested in purchasing multiple plots of land
could draw a shape on a map and be immediately told the aggregate price
of the whole region. This could be done for a variety of competing sites
for a potential development and the information could even be fed to an
optimization engine to find the lowest cost development site. This could
dramatically reduce the transaction costs of property acquisition, and all
this could be done without ever tipping off owners to the buyer’s interest,
as all prices would be posted on the electronic cadaster. The holdout
problem, the bane of developers everywhere (see, e.g., Fennell 2011),
would be solved. The same would be true of similar development prob-
lems outside of physical space, such as in the creation of spectrum bands
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to be used for the next generation of wireless Internet or searching for the
availability of domain names for a potential new company.
(ii) A buyer interested in a used car could search the cadaster in a manner like
how e-commerce sites allow the comparison of a variety of potential
purchases from different sellers. Cars would be sorted to make them
maximally comparable, both by distance to the buyer and by objective
characteristics. One of the worst distortions in our mind from monopoly
power is not merely the reduction in turnover, but the time wasted on
bargaining.26 Cars are a leading example of this. In our world, used-car
dealerships would shut down, as cars parked on the city streets would
effectively become a giant, eBay-style dealership that cuts out the middle-
man and the wasteful bargaining process.
(iii) A buyer in the proximity of any object could easily determine its value
using an IoT connection between the object and the cadaster app on her
smartphone, make an electronic payment, and walk away with it.27 A
buyer could also find the prices of comparable items within a reasonable
vicinity.
(iv) Buyers would quickly be able to determine whether an item was missing
from the cadaster, allowing such a buyer to take the item for free, or to
notify the authorities who would confiscate the property and give the
buyer a bounty.
Implementing such an easily usable system will doubtless come at a cost, in
terms of the breadth and flexibility of the system. Allowing expression of max-
imally rich complementarities and substitution across items might limit the
accessibility of user interface or lead to confusion among users. The existing
rules of property law appear to reflect such a concern (Merrill 2012), but they
also reflect the level of information technology that existed centuries ago. Given
the dramatic advances in the sophistication of electronic commerce in recent
years, it seems likely a system with substantial flexibility and usability could be
built even at present and very likely in the future.
2.5 Investment Subsidies
Weyl & Zhang (2017) estimate an optimal Harberger taxation rate well below
the allocatively efficient rate based on the assumption that a higher rate—one
that maximized allocative efficiency—would create excessive distortion in
26 Which also produces opportunities for race and sex discrimination. See, e.g., Ayres (1991). The
Harberger tax, by shielding the identity of the ultimate buyer, would make this type of discrimin-
ation impossible.
27 On whether an interval of delay should be built into the system, see Subsection 3.3 below.
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investment incentives. However, a higher taxation rate would be viable if the
government could independently subsidize investment. Such an approach, if
viable, would enhance both allocative and investment efficiency.
To see how such a system could work, suppose that improvements or de-
preciation to property can be at least approximately observed by the cadaster,
and their value to potential purchasers assessed. Property owners would be
allowed to deduct that amount (on a refundable basis) from the Harberger
tax owed on a property. Because this subsidy replaces the reduction in invest-
ment value created by the tax, the system creates no disincentive for investments
(Weyl & Zhang 2017, p. 33). A natural approach would be to implement this
credit per a depreciation schedule based on when the value created is expected
to accrue, with the interpretation that the credits would be inherited by any
future purchaser of the asset and thus incorporated into the asset value.
However, at present, surveys to determine investment are conducted infre-
quently, making an up-to-date assessment difficult to conduct and thus object-
ive assessments noisy. Therefore, at present it would likely be necessary to rely,
as with investment tax credits, on a combination of random audits with selfre-
ported investments. Such a system might create significant opportunities for
gaming and noise, making investment incentives far from perfect and thus
continuing to limit optimal Harberger tax rates.
However, we speculate that advances in technology will ameliorate these
problems. Nikhil Naik, in collaboration with a variety of colleagues, has de-
veloped methods for using Google’s Street View images to produce high quality,
low cost, high throughput, and frequent assessments of real property values for
tax purposes.28 While these methods are obviously imperfect, even for real
property (there may be ways to make real property look good from the outside,
while maintaining internal flaws, or to trick the relevant algorithms), they seem
a promising basis for making objectively assessed property subsidies that are
precise enough to offset the investment deterrents of common ownership.
While this method applies only to real property, improvements in the tech-
nology of the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT) seem likely to make analo-
gous methods practicable for a wide range of property. The goal of the IoT
agenda is to allow a wide range of physical objects to be closely monitored and
supervised digitally. For example, many vehicles are already monitored by elec-
tronic systems, which record distance driven, the quality of driving, and main-
tenance.29 It seems likely that in many years, quite accurate evaluations of
28 This work has not yet been published, but for discussions of two other applications of the same
techniques, see Naik et al. (2014, p. 793); Naik, Raskar & Hildalgo (2016).
29 These systems are already used by insurance companies and employers. See Lieber (2014).
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capital investments, perhaps even more accurate than those carried out by a
human potential purchaser, will be available electronically, and thus could be
employed by the cadaster.
To see how this approach might work in the context of real estate, imagine
that new houses of a certain type and in a certain location require $4,000 of
maintenance per year, on average. The current owner of a house would notify
the cadaster whenever the plumber or electrician did maintenance work by
emailing the bills to it. The cadaster would verify the claims electronically,
relying on sensors in the house that are connected to the Internet. It would
then determine the amount by which this maintenance increased the value of
the house relative to what it would otherwise have been; say $10,000. Every year
the individual would receive a $10,000 refundable deduction against her taxes.
If the tax rate was 10 percent and the assessed value of her house was $150,000,
her tax would be reduced from $15,000 to $14,000. This is an example for
standard maintenance but a similar approach could be taken for remodeling.
If an algorithmic analysis of visual images concluded that the value of the house
had been increased, in a renovation, by $40,000 per annum for the next 10 years
then in each of these years the house would carry with it a $40,000 refundable
deduction against the Harberger taxes owed; at a 10 percent tax rate this would
be worth $4,000 per year.
These observations illustrate an old but important idea: the optimal form of
property rights depends on the technologies that are available to measure,
manage, and record the things that people value (Smith 2012). We speculate
that as technologies improve for monitoring investments, there will be a whole-
sale shift from private property to partial common ownership.
2.6 The Role of Information Technology
While a Harberger tax system might prove viable with existing technology, it
would benefit greatly from technological advances that are already on the hori-
zon. The system we propose is both complementary with and the logical ex-
treme of three of the most prominent trends in digital markets in recent years:
the “sharing economy”, the “Internet of Things (IoT)”, and “blockchains”.
A primary benefit of the sharing economy is that it ensures that all capital
assets are fully utilized by their most valuable users at all points in time,
rather than laying idle for long periods; the catchphrase of this movement is
“unused value is wasted value”.
However, so far most of the innovations in the sharing economy have been
directed to reducing the physical and computational costs of moving goods and
making matches; they do not alleviate the problems of market power that our
proposal addresses. Uber, for example, only partly addresses allocative
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efficiency problems by allowing people who might otherwise buy cars (after
costly bargaining) to rely on rideshares (where they “rent” rides based on pub-
licly available prices in a reasonably competitive market that includes other
rideshare companies, taxis, and public transportation). But Uber drivers have
no ability to take underutilized cars from current owners without a long and
messy bargaining process. Thus, Uber’s progress against the monopoly problem
is minimal, and could fall to zero if Uber itself ever obtains a monopoly. As we
discuss further in Subsection 4.5 further, to take the step we envision, a firm
would have to own all the relevant vehicles, and charge membership fees to
those interested in purchasing them. Only then would the firm be able to cap-
ture the benefits associated with reducing the monopoly distortion. Such a firm
would effectively have the sort of broad monopoly power that the state pos-
sesses and it is dubious whether it is socially desirable for such a system to be
implemented privately for this reason. Nonetheless, the Uber experience is
valuable in showing the potential impact of information technology: what it
has already accomplished for private institutions would be magnified many
times if legal institutions took advantage of these technological innovations
as well.
Similarly, the movement in IoT to connect property to the Internet is aligned
with our objectives. While so far, this movement has had a limited impact on
the marketplace, implementing our system would both accelerate the progress
of IoT and be greatly supported by the development of IoT technologies.
Individuals would have an incentive to connect their property to the IoT to
gain help with valuing goods. For example, individuals might prefer not to
attach a valuation to their refrigerator; if the refrigerator were connected
to the IoT, an automated system could explore the prices of similar local re-
frigerators and spit out a default valuation that the owner could adjust or leave
alone. IoT technologies would also, as we discuss below, make it easier to
monitor tax deductions for investments and recommend potential investments
to participants. And allowing automated cataloging of the state of physical
objects would play a similar role in helping to determine the appropriate de-
ductions to be given for investment in assets like real estate.
Finally, our proposal fits neatly with the increasing popularity of “smart
contracts” on blockchains that offer a mode of governance that is self enforcing
and decentralized. In these systems, most famously epitomized by the recent
community “Ethereum” (Robert 2016) contracts are written into the code of a
collectively monitored transaction system whose operations are coordinated by
the unanimous consent of the participants’ computers. The goal is to avoid
allowing discretionary power that is potentially subject to abuse to lie with any
central authority. Because our proposal operates through simple rules that
could be administered in an automated way, with taxes that are collected
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being automatically redistributed in a prespecified manner to participants, it
opens perhaps for the first time the possibility of truly decentralized “common
ownership” that does not require any discretionary state authority to adminis-
ter. It is because of this possibility that we anthropomorphized the “cadaster”
itself throughout this article; it may soon be possible to administer a system like
that the one we describe with very little centralized human oversight. Of course,
this is not the only or even necessarily the best form of administration and
recent work on such systems has been full of bugs (Economist 2016). But, as
with the other technological trends we highlight, there is a natural complemen-
tarity between our proposal and these developments in computation.
This all suggests that an important reason why Harberger taxation has not
been used in the past is that without modern information technologies it would
have been challenging to implement, would have required relatively low tax
rates, and would have generated quite limited welfare gains. Conversely, we
believe its benefits will grow in coming years. Our framework provides a way to
understand and predict the coevolution of market technologies (produced by
the private sector) and property rights (produced by the government).
It is important to note, however, that a crucial implicit assumption we have
employed here is that while technology will increasingly allow the government
to monitor the physical state of assets and help individuals to sort and search
through assets, it will not directly allow centralized authorities to observe in-
dividuals’ private preferences without their consent. If it did allow this, then the
central planning envisioned by Lange, Lerner, and Taylor would become more
desirable than the sorts of decentralized market solutions we advocate (see
Subsection 4.1 further; see generally Lange (1967, p. 158–61). We do not
think that information technology will achieve such “mind-reading” capacity
in the near future.
2.7 Liabilities
Many assets are partially financed or encumbered by liabilities or other interests
and these liabilities are, in turn, typically owned by individuals different from
the possessor of the direct asset. The example that comes most easily to mind is
that real estate is frequently encumbered with mortgages, leases, easements,
covenants and the like. Yet many other, less common or more sophisticated
arrangements exist regarding other assets, especially in the business setting.
Corporate bonds are liabilities on corporate balance sheets, owned by bond-
holders; equity, while not technically a liability, controls and earns cash flows
from businesses; options written on the stock of the company encumber the
stock of the individual who wrote the options, etc.
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Such liabilities, and the secondary assets they create, not only imply some
additional complexities but also opportunities for a system of Harberger tax-
ation. The opportunity is that liabilities could themselves be subject to the tax,
but because they have negative value this would imply a subsidy rather than a
tax. Indebted individuals could quote a price for these liabilities that they would
be willing to pay for anyone who would be willing to relieve them of this
liability. They would have to stand ready to raise this amount if anyone offered
to do so, but would receive an annual subsidy (or in practice usually a deduc-
tion from the Harberger tax they owe on other assets) corresponding to this
liability. This would alleviate a reverse monopoly problem (effectively a mon-
opsony problem) associated with individuals refinancing or otherwise passing
on liabilities that they are no longer the efficient bearers of but might hold out
on the refinancing of because of their market power (Keys et al. 2016).30 More
generally, individuals could declare any obligation of theirs that they have the
right to transfer to be a “liability” that they receive a deduction for as long as
they stand ready to pay another individual to discharge that liability at the self-
assessed price.
Furthermore, using this approach to avoid the double or triple taxation of
assets on which multiple layers of liabilities and resultant secondary assets are
written allows for Harberger taxation to apply and thus aid the efficient allo-
cation not only to the primary underlying asset, but also the secondary assets
written on top of it. We highlight the benefits of such a system in the example of
corporate equity securities in Subsection 4.3 further.
However, there would also be some subtle design elements in applying
Harberger taxation in this manner. Many liabilities are so tightly tied to an
asset or to an individual that it would not be appropriate for the liability to be
taken on by a new individual who does not possess the asset unless either the
owner of the secondary asset controlling that liability consents or the asset the
liability encumbers is simultaneously acquired. Yet, this issue does not pose
fundamentally different problems than those in Subsection 2.3 above regarding
complementarities across assets. When issuing a loan, a lender could (as at
present) specify in the terms of the loan the extent and nature of the bundling
or unbundling allowed between the loan and the individual or tied asset. If the
loan is fully tied to the asset, then any asset purchaser would have to buy the
associated liability (or simultaneously purchase the loan itself from the lender
to remove it). If the loan is tied to the individual but not to the asset, then the
asset could be sold but the lender would have to grant permission for the
liability to be transferred. Other more elaborate terms could be included, and
30 See Keys et al. (2016) for evidence of this behavior.
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the lender could choose as she wished in her self-assessment of her secondary
asset in the loan bundle together these terms or separately assess a value on each
one, allowing for the purchase of each by an individual interested in removing a
covenant on the loan.
Thus, while Harberger taxation would change the nature of ownership and
taxation of sophisticated financial arrangements and would thus allow for
greater efficiency, it would not undermine the possibility of sophisticated
forms of financing. However, it might to some extent reduce the need for
such financing because it would dramatically reduce the liquidity and cash
requirements for purchasing assets as it would reduce their capitalized value.
We return to this point in Subsection 3.2 further.
3. SOME PRACTICAL CHALLENGES
Beyond the broad questions of design, there are several specific practical ob-
jections to our proposal that need to be addressed before it could achieve sup-
port. While many of these issues would need to be worked out in greater detail
over time and with experience, in this section we provide a sketch of how we
imagine confronting these challenges and why we do not view them as likely to
outweigh the benefits of Harberger taxation.31
3.1 Transitional Issues
One possible objection to Harberger taxation is that applying it to existing assets
could involve large-scale redistribution of wealth. A 5 to 10 percent annual tax
on the stock capital value of an asset would reduce the value of privately held
capital by 50 to 75 percent, depending on market interest rates, because the
expected future tax payments would be capitalized into the assets’ values. The
disproportionate owners of capital assets—primarily the wealthy and powerful,
as well as anyone else who draws most of their income from capital (including
many of the elderly)—would hardly be happy with such a tax. And such a
transfer of value from people who worked hard to earn money that they used
to buy houses, cars, and treasured items might be regarded as unfair. Hence, the
Harberger tax is dead on arrival.
31 We do not address all issues; it is worth flagging here one: the treatment of moveable assets if their
current possessors seek to emigrate them or sell them to foreigners living in foreign countries. At one
level, the problem is akin to a person who rents a car in the USA, drives it to Canada, and attempts to
sell it. This is illegal. But a more sophisticated response would be to require people who seek to move
property overseas into an ordinary private property regime to pay the state for its share of the
property, effectively in the form of a tax, which would be roughly equal to the expected discounted
value of all the taxes the person would have been expected to pay over the useful life of the property if
it had remained in the country.
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This objection is seriously defective. The Harberger tax creates far more
wealth than it depletes, and much of this wealth will flow to the apparent
losers. While a homeowner’s house will lose value, that person will save on
lower prices when she buys a home in the future or rents an apartment. But the
more important response is that the way that the gains from Harberger taxation
are distributed is, itself, a political question. The public, acting through the
government, can choose to compensate people who, on net, lose from
Harberger taxation. In Subsection 2.1 above we discussed various ways in
which the revenue could be used to achieve such compensation. Indeed,
Harberger taxation does not pose any unique transitional issues; any new
tax—including a conventional tax on real estate, for example—creates winners
and losers. If the transitional shock is too great, the tax can be introduced in
stages—starting with administrative property rights that are newly created and
hence do not redistribute existing wealth—and with some degree of
compensation.
Another worry is that a new tax like the Harberger tax would unsettle the
public’s expectations about the government’s propensity to tax, leading to dis-
tortions in their behavior. Although one of the older doctrines in economic
thought is that a one-time capital levy does not distort investment behavior
because people do not anticipate it, a tax today can create expectations of
additional taxes in the future (Eichengreen 1989), and damage the reputation
of the government that enacts them, causing lasting damage to economic in-
stitutions (Persson & Tabellini. 1994). However, it is widely believed that if a
capital tax is imposed for a clear efficiency purpose, rather than redistributive
purpose, the chance of its continuing to increase is greatly reduced, because
there is no reason its optimal rate will rise over time.32 The losses to private
individuals from the Harberger tax, given that these losses follow from an
efficiency rationale, are not basically different from losses on capital resulting
from technological progress or any other large-scale change in government
policy, including ordinary tax and regulatory changes.
It is thus not clear that there would be any great harm created by the im-
position of Harberger taxes on existing assets, even if it involved substantial
redistribution.33 While the desirability of such redistribution is beyond the
scope of our analysis here, there have been growing calls in recent years for
32 Given our discussion in Subsection 2.1 above, it may be that the optimal rate will rise over time, but
only as the ability to provide deductions for investments improves. Because such deductions would
compensate for the increased rates they should not, on average, discourage investment.
33 Obviously, provisions would have to be made to avoid capital flight in anticipation of the levy, as
with any capital levy, though the application of the tax over time and thus the capitalization of the
tax into asset prices rather than a one-time expropriation would largely mitigate this concern.
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such a large-scale redistribution from current private owners of capital to the
broader public as we discussed in Subsection 2.1 above. Harberger taxation has
the enduring benefit in this regard of ensuring that however large of a part of
national income is eventually received by capital, sufficient income will con-
tinue to accrue to the public at large to ensure a reasonable distribution of
income.
3.2 Liquidity and Fairness
Some people may, after holding property for an extended period, develop spe-
cial attachments to it and yet not have sufficient liquid assets to pay the taxes to
preserve it from being taken from them. This concern parallels controversies
over eminent domain procedures where an elderly resident, for example, is
forced to move out of a house that has been owned by her family for gener-
ations, to make way for an apartment block or casino. Any system that weakens
people’s bonds to personal property might be regarded as unacceptable.
We have four reactions to this objection. First, we do not believe that such
attachments are very common, and, more important, we suspect that such
attachments will become less common in a world in which most property is
not “owned” in the traditional sense. Many people love their cars, but fewer
such attachments come into existence when more and more people rely on
Uber, Lyft, Zipcar, and public transportation, and this process would be accel-
erated under Harberger taxation, where a kind of Zipcar model would become
the norm rather than exception. People can be train enthusiasts without owning
trains. 34 In fact, Weyl and Zhang show that the reduction in incentives to form
attachments or otherwise invest in improvements valued only by them and not
by future owners created by Harberger taxation always enhance efficiency.35
Second, our system would reduce the role of liquidity and resource con-
straints in stopping individuals from owning property that is valuable to
them. Under the present regime, individuals unable to borrow the funds to
own a house (or other large property purchase) are forced to rent; even when
34 The idea that people are excessively attached to material possessions has long been a theme of
religious leaders and social reformers.
35 Another common objection to Harberger taxation is that possessors may deliberately sabotage the
value of an asset to others to allow for a lower tax payment. Weyl and Zhang (2017) also show that
this objection is misleading; if the tax rate is below the turnover rate, possessors set prices above their
willingness to accept and thus benefit from rather than being harmed by takings. Thus, while their
incentives to make their property attractive to others are somewhat muted, they are not eliminated
and certainly not reversed. Even if, in a few cases, tax rates are above the asset-specific optimal
turnover, issues of sabotage arise in many cases in present law (e.g., the tenant who has been evicted,
or the homeowner whose house has been foreclosed on) and egregious examples could be prohibited
by law.
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borrowing is possible, it imposes great risks on the borrower. Under our system,
the prices of assets would be only a quarter to a half of their current level. This
would enable individuals to raise a far smaller quantity of cash to gain “own-
ership”, albeit a more limited form of it. Thus, our system might actually in-
crease the degree of home security on average in a society like the USA where
nearly 40 percent of families rent.
Such reductions in housing as an illiquid and lumpy store of wealth might
have other benefits, such as limiting the possibility of bubbles, allowing people
to move more easily to job opportunities, reducing neighborhood blight, and
reducing the financial risk individuals face from fluctuations in housing prices.
Furthermore, the dramatic reduction in the price of assets would make the taxes
necessary to maintain ownership much more manageable, even for relatively
liquidity-constrained (partial) owners. For example, if a tax of 10 percent
reduced asset values by two-thirds, the tax would be 10 percent of one-third
of the original value. In other words, the fraction of current values the owner
would pay each year would only be a little more than 3 percent. This is higher,
but not dramatically higher, than current property taxes, which already may
have the effects of driving illiquid owners out of their homes (since the wealth
they could otherwise use to pay property taxes are locked up in their houses)
and is substantially less than the sum of property taxes and mortgage payments
on a typical house, which are closer to 6 percent at present.
Third, people could gain the liquidity to make tax payments through insur-
ance schemes offered by private firms. The insurance would cover the tax pay-
ments in exchange for a share of the gains if the house were sold at the going
price. This could reduce the illiquidity of individuals who own valuable prop-
erty but wish not to sell it with a high probability. Of course, this would only
work if they accepted some chance of selling their home, but would overcome
many of the pure liquidity issues.
Finally, a more comprehensive system of insurance against, for example,
changing local house prices, could address most of the concerns that changes
in asset market prices could force an individual out of their home. Obviously,
the same concerns would apply to renters under the present system, and yet in
practice this rarely occurs. Most renters do not purchase, if they even have
access to, insurance products protecting them against rises in their rent. Our
system might effectively make “renting” more common (though it might also
allow many renters to move into partial ownership) and would thus be com-
plementary to improvements in the quality of insurance for renters against
price changes, such as investments in real estate, or derivatives such as those
proposed by Shiller (1993).
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3.3 Disruption and Planning
Another concern is that many assets are costly to transfer frequently and at
unexpected times. Moving is costly, so leases on real property usually have
terms of at least one year. It may not be desirable for individuals to be forced
to move immediately and unexpectedly out of a property they own. Therefore,
for example, even eviction proceedings are complex and may take an extended
period. Suddenly losing one’s car, personal computer, or desk chair would also
be disruptive. Such concerns, however, could be dealt with in a natural way
through small changes to the administration of Harberger taxes. One simple
change, inspired by the way evictions are treated in current law, would be to
give a period of a few months for a current owner to move out of real property
or surrender a piece of personal property to a new owner.
A somewhat more significant but still modest change would be to allow
owners to declare intervals up to some reasonable limit (say a year or two)
during which they wish to maintain ownership. Upon declaring such an inter-
val, the individual would have to declare a value and allow potential purchasers
a “last chance” to claim the good before such an interval began. Then, during
that interval, the individual would only be allowed to adjust the price (and thus
the tax paid) on the asset upward, until the end of the interval. After the end of
the interval, downward adjustment would be allowed, along with the oppor-
tunity to purchase the good. Additionally, any prospective future owner would
have the right to claim the property at the current price at any time during this
interval. If such a claim were made, however, the property would not be sur-
rendered until the end of the interval. The current owner would have to con-
tinue paying taxes on the property at the purchase price until surrender
occurred, at the end of the interval or at an earlier time if the owner felt un-
expectedly that she could surrender it earlier. In any case, the owner would be
legally prohibited from receiving any consideration for early sale from the
prospective buyer, as that would allow her to exercise monopoly power over
the right of delay. Some adjustments might have to be made for the time value
of money, but we abstract from these for the moment.
Such an adjustment would eliminate the most severe harms associated with
“interruptions” in ownership at a relatively limited cost in terms of making
assets more illiquid. Furthermore, owners would not have an incentive to de-
clare such illiquid periods unless interruption were costly to them, as such
periods would raise their tax burden by making downward price revisions im-
possible for a time. The ability to lock in a purchase price for a buyer at any time
would maintain most of the benefits of avoiding holdout problems and the
prohibition on consideration for early sale would avoid most of the costs of
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exploiting this rule strategically to exercise monopoly power over potential
purchasers.36
Finally, we should mention that some readers worry that property owners
would find it difficult or impossible to calculate the correct prices, and thus,
would constantly take the risk that they will lose some valued piece of property.
The cost of obtaining and processing information about the market’s demand
for one’s property would be incurred by everyone on a continuing basis.
However, this problem is already a ubiquitous feature of the market economy
in which we all operate all the time. Calculating retirement payoffs, choosing
among credit instruments, timing the sale of one’s house and one’s purchase of
a replacement house, buying insurance, and so on, are all immensely compli-
cated mathematical problems that no one really tries to solve with exactitude,
instead relying on advice or instinct, and potentially incurring tremendous
losses or losing opportunities for gain because of error. Government regulations
that are justified for helping people avoid mistakes in these cases are, mutatis
mutandis, appropriate for our proposal as well. Furthermore, the greater avail-
ability of information about prevailing asset values created by the market itself
would be useful to individuals in deciding on their own valuations. In any case,
small misvaluations would not have devastating consequences; individuals
would find it relatively easy to ensure their reported values were at least the
minimum amount they would be willing to accept to sell and beyond this point
the tradeoff is simply between profits on sales and taxes, which decay gradually
with small valuation changes.
3.4 Inspections and Transfers
A final issue is that before purchasing an asset, many potential buyers will want
to inspect it to ensure its quality and fit to their preferences. During such an
inspection process, it would clearly be problematic to allow the owner to revise
her price in anticipation of an increased chance of being able to exert monopoly
power. A reasonable solution would be for prospective buyers to be allowed to
freeze the price of a potential purchase to investigate it in exchange for the
36 Some readers have suggested that under the Harberger tax system, rich people could torment less
wealthy enemies by forcing purchases of property from them to which they have sentimental at-
tachments, like jewelry. However, if the Harberger tax system is applied to such items, then the tax
will be very low because the optimal turnover rate is low, which means that the owner can protect the
property by paying a very low tax, and should feel fully compensated if the property is taken, in
which case the wealthy person can no more harm her by taking the property than by offering to buy
property at the seller’s price in the current system. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that similar
problems arise under our current system—for example, the spite fence problem—and tort and
related doctrines have been developed to address them. The law may need to address these challenges
as they arise in a pragmatic fashion but there is no reason that the Harberger system would lend itself
to gaming and abuse more than our current system does.
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payment of a small fraction of the asset’s quoted value (say 1 percent) being
made as an irrevocable payment, with this payment being refundable if some
clear misrepresentation about the value of the asset were discovered during this
process. This hold would persist for a reasonable period necessary for the in-
spection, and then would lapse. Because the exact percentage that is reasonable
and the length of time for a hold that is reasonable depend on the asset in
question we leave precise settings of these parameters for future research and
empirical experience.
4. APPLICATIONS
We begin by discussing the application of our approach in more limited do-
mains where the practical challenges we raised in Section 3 are relatively
modest. These areas are the most promising domains for applying our approach
in the short term, but also are somewhat narrow, and thus offer a more limited
upside. We then turn to corporate assets and acquisitions and traditional prop-
erty transactions, where our approach will be more controversial, but also offers
the greatest potential social benefit. We conclude this section with a discussion
of private sector applications to frame the scope and implications of our
argument.
4.1 Administrative Property and Publicly Owned Assets
4.1.1 Spectrum
Economists have had more influence over the design and allocation of property
entitlements to electromagnetic spectrum than over any other kind of property.
While spectrum was initially allocated to users on a first-come-first-serve basis
aimed at simply allowing the maximum number of broadcasters to use the
spectrum, by the late 1920s the Federal Communications Commission began
allocating the spectrum based on “public interest” hearings.37 In 1951, inspired
by the same work of Abba Lerner that inspired Vickrey’s interest in auctions,
Leo Barzel proposed auctioning use rights while retaining public ownership to
ensure competition in these auctions (Herzel 1951). Ronald Coase (1959) first
proposed the ideas that came to be known as the “Coase theorem” as a justi-
fication for full privatization of the spectrum based on a one-time auction. After
years of discussion and a cumbersome experiment with allocating cellular tel-
ephony spectrum by lottery during the 1980s, the first spectrum auctions were
organized in the 1990s.
37 Our historical narrative here derives from Hazlett (1998).
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Because these auctions involved selling off a large collection of diverse rights
that might be complementary or substitutable with each other, the design of the
auction proved a long and complex process (Milgrom 2004). The eventual
format settled on, after detailed consultation with many leading microecono-
mists, involved simultaneous English (ascending price) auctions on all lots. This
design was widely copied around the world and was viewed as reasonably suc-
cessful, but left two important issues open that became the focus of changes to
design and policy making in the decades since.
First, the simultaneous ascending auction can be a problematic format for
participants who view different licenses as complementary with one another,
such as a cellular carrier trying to establish a national footprint. A participant
bidding on a subset of licenses does not know, until she is already stuck buying
some of the licenses, what the prices on the other licenses she is pursuing will be.
This “exposure” problem stimulated the development of new auctions that
allow bidders to express preferences for collections of licenses rather than just
individual licenses (Ausubel & Milgrom 2002; Ausubel 2004). However, these
auctions have turned out to have their own deficiencies related to potential
collusion and predation that make them of questionable practical utility (Levin
& Skrzypacz 2016). At present there is both disagreement about the best avail-
able format for auctioning these licenses, and a concern that no satisfactory
format is currently available. These concerns are acute because, as one of the
most influential designers of these auctions, Paul Milgrom, has argued, private
property rights over spectrum make the reallocation of spectrum inefficient and
thus make the efficiency of an initial allocation crucial (Milgrom 2004).
In fact, the second major concern with spectrum policy relates directly to the
difficulty of reallocation after an initial assignment. Because of the rapid ad-
vance of wireless technologies, new possibilities for using spectrum to supply
high speed and broadly available Internet connections have opened in the two
decades since the initial auctions. However, the monopoly power of current
license holders—both auction winners and especially those allocated licenses
under the older system—has impeded implementation of these new technolo-
gies (Eisenach 2011). This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that many
of these new uses require assembling many complementary current licenses to
form large contiguous blocks, creating opportunities for holdout by current
license owners (Kominers & Weyl 2012).
In 2012, Congress authorized a plan allowing the FCC to buy back spectrum
and “repack” the rights of those who refuse to sell to maximize the contiguous
spectrum available. The “reverse auction” to buy back these rights is underway
as of this writing (Milgrom & Segal 2015). However, nearly a decade elapsed
from the time that spectrum reallocation was recognized as clearly necessary to
the present. Such delays are widely seen as having placed the USA behind
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nations such as Israel, where the next generation of wireless Internet has been
available for years. These delays have led to political pressure from a variety of
industry groups, such as the Dynamic Spectrum Alliance, calling for reform of
the system of spectrum allocation to ensure that innovation is not held back by
monopoly power and the bureaucratic process of organizing a centralized
auction.
Furthermore, given that the current auction system still entitles owners to
refuse to sell their licenses, it does not eliminate all opportunities for socially
costly holdout. Empirical analysis by Ulrich Doraszelski and his co-authors
(Doraszelski et al. 2016) suggests that recent maneuvers by private equity
firms to buy up large numbers of licenses to raise prices in the auction may
substantially reduce the revenue raised by the government and spectrum suc-
cessfully reallocated because of the monopoly power it will convey.
Replacing the current licensing regime with a Harberger tax regime could
address many of these concerns. Once Congress put the Harberger tax regime in
place, the tax would create a liquid and far less distorted market for reallocating
licenses across users without requiring major additional legislative or admin-
istrative actions like those underlying the latest auctions. This would create
flexibility for continuous dynamic reallocation, permitting continual innov-
ation in uses, and the turnover of property to new technology firms.
Moreover, the Harberger tax system would address many of the problems
mentioned above. First, the ability to flexibly reallocate spectrum over time
would dramatically reduce the harms associated with an imperfect initial auc-
tion allocation, alleviating many of the concerns about the format mentioned
above. Second, the continual availability of prices on all licenses would reduce
the magnitude of potential exposure and holdout problems. Finally, a major
challenge in the current spectrum reallocation has been how to implement new
uses, while staying within the interference constraints, which exist to ensure that
existing users can continue to use the spectrums they own. If rights could be
more flexibly decoupled, marketed, and reallocated using methods like those we
described in Subsection 2.3 above, it seems likely that private sector innovations
in satisfying these constraints could be allowed to improve the allocation well
beyond what has been possible through the central direction of the FCC. In
turn, the FCC could simply enforce the interference rules; collect the taxes to
fund its other activities and return the excess to the treasury (as it does with
auctions); and administer a central computerized cadaster of current license
holdings.
Furthermore, several factors make the implementation of Harberger taxation
in this setting seem reasonably possible. Perhaps most important, the FCC has
shown itself open to the use of innovative ideas from economic theory in the
design of spectrum licenses and their auctioning. Additionally, some licenses,
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especially in rural areas and to channels previously used for military purposes,
remain unassigned, and thus could be placed under a new licensing regime if
they are eventually auctioned with minimal disruption to existing entitlements.
Such relatively limited settings could offer an opportunity for experimentation
with new and improved property regimes.
However, even this relatively clean application of the Harberger tax regime
faces some practical design challenges. Most important is that it would require a
substantial political conflict to force existing license holders, who paid large
sums in previous auctions or were grandfathered in under previous systems, to
submit to high levels of Harberger taxation that would expropriate those in-
vestments. In expanding Harberger taxation beyond new licenses to existing
entitlements, some of the concerns we discussed in Subsection 3.1 would arise
and some of the solutions we suggested there would have to be deployed.
Another important concern is the treatment of investments that are comple-
mentary with broadcasting on a channel. Such investments (broadcasting and
tuning equipment, studios for producing programming, etc.) are imperfectly
portable across owners of a license and stations from which that owner oper-
ates. The natural way to handle this would be to subject all equipment and other
complementary investments to Harberger taxation, but allow owners to deter-
mine, as in Subsection 3.3, whether to connect or separate these goods. In cases
such as equipment tightly coupled to the station, it would likely make sense for
a license holder to tie the equipment to the station, as this equipment would be
mostly valueless to her if her channel were taken. On the contrary, the broadcast
studios and investments in content production are highly tied to the owner and
are largely portable across channels; in fact, in the current spectrum realloca-
tion, many television stations are being moved across channels at apparently
quite limited cost to the broadcasters. Such investments, however, would be of
limited value to a new owner, and thus it would typically be optimal to decouple
these from the station. The rates of taxation applied to each of these assets
would likely also be different, given that the optimal turnover rate of the chan-
nel and broadcast equipment is likely greater than that of assets related to
content production.
Furthermore, given the broad regulatory powers the FCC has over broad-
casting, it is plausible that it already has the authority to impose taxes on
broadcast equipment and content production facilities, though this merits fur-
ther study. However, even if the FCC lacks this authority at present, it would
not be difficult for the FCC to determine the investments that would be subject
to this tax. Equipment used directly in broadcasting is highly specialized and
can be distinguished easily from other property. Content production facilities
and employment relationships may be a bit more nebulous. For example, some
content production facilities produce programming for both traditional
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broadcast and for internet streaming—should those facilities be taxable by the
FCC as part of “broadcasting”? In practice, however, these ambiguities are
minor. Most local broadcasters primarily reach audiences via broadcast; a
threshold could be set for exemption from the tax for facilities that produce
content that overwhelmingly reaches consumers over the Internet.
Furthermore, content production is sufficiently unlikely to be tightly comple-
mentary with a channel, meaning that exempting content production from the
tax would likely cause, at most, a very limited loss of efficiency. This separation
of content facilities from broadcast equipment is already implemented in the
current regime of spectrum repacking, and thus would not pose substantial
administrative concerns, beyond those already appearing at present. Spectrum
thus seems a promising first experiment in the use of Harberger taxation with
universal compulsory purchase provisions.38
4.1.2 Assigned names and numbers
Internet domain names enable web users to locate a desired website by typing in
an easily remembered string of text into the address bar of their browser. The
domain name for Google, for example, is simply www.google.com. Businesses
like Google place a great deal of value on possessing domain names that are
identical to or like the name of the business, brand, or product. So do govern-
mental units, private organizations, and ordinary individuals.39
To obtain a domain name, a person or business applies through various
registries. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers admin-
isters the domain name system. The system distributes names on a first-come,
first-served basis. If Posner applies for glenweyl.com before Weyl does, then
Posner “owns” the glenweyl.com domain name. If Weyl wants the domain
name badly enough, he must buy it from Posner like any other property.
In the early days of the Internet, this system gave rise to the problem of
“cybersquatting” (Lipton 2005). Many corporations were slow to realize the
importance of domain names, allowing entrepreneurial individuals to snatch
the corresponding domain names before the corporations applied for them and
then offer to sell the names to the corporations for an exorbitant price. For
example, a fellow named Dennis Toeppen registered the Panavision.com
domain name and then offered to sell it to Panavision for $13,000. Toeppen
did not have any business interest in the Panavision name other than the desire
to extract money from the company. Cybersquatting is a straightforward
38 Rhoni Gericke is currently developing a detailed version of these ideas that works out many of these
details.
39 See ericposner.com (last visited July 29, 2016); glenweyl.com (last visited July 29, 2016).
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example of the type of allocative inefficiency that can arise in a regime of private
property. If people like Toeppen can seize domain names and then hold out
against the companies and persons who value them the most, then—because of
bargaining failure—some portion of domain names will not be allocated to
their highest value users. The courts halted cybersquatting through an aggres-
sive (and possibly dubious) interpretation of trademark law, which was subse-
quently ratified by legislation.40
However, cybersquatting is only the most extreme form of behavior that
causes allocative inefficiency for domain names. Courts can stop it because
the squatter cannot show that the domain name has any intrinsic value to
him or her, while it is obvious that a major corporation places a high value
on an eponymous domain name. The law has not been able to address other
kinds of problems. Consider, for example, the conflict between Delta Airlines,
Delta Financial, and DeltaComm Internet Services over the delta.com domain
name.41 The delta.com name was initially acquired in 1993 by DeltaComm
Internet Services, apparently for legitimate business reasons—delta is a shor-
tened version of its name. However, DeltaComm was clearly not the highest
value user of the name; indeed, the company’s website attracted bewildered
customers seeking airline tickets. But DeltaComm and Delta could not agree on
a price, and DeltaComm sold the domain name to Delta Financial. Delta sued
Delta Financial, and eventually the two companies settled, with the domain
name ending up in Delta’s hands where it belonged. Fans of the Coase Theorem
might reflect on the fact that this simple transaction involving two entities took
four years, and no doubt cost millions of dollars in legal fees (Elliot 2000).42
The existing legal regime cannot resolve this problem because all three com-
panies had a legitimate business interest in the delta.com domain name. The
only question from a policy perspective was which company valued the name
most. To resolve this question in a court, it would be necessary for the judge to
determine which company valued the domain name the most. But, as we have
explained, the premise of the system of private property is that government
officials, like judges are not equipped to make such valuations except in extreme
cases exemplified by cybersquatting where it is obvious that one party attaches
no value to the property except for its holdout potential.
40 See Panavision I, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998);
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). The legal developments
are described in Lipton (2005), 1369–81.
41 As discussed by Lipton (2005, p. 1406–1407), citing Elliot (2000).
42 For a discussion of the limits of Coasean logic, as applied to domain names, see Chander (2003,
pp. 781–791).
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The Harberger tax offers a simple and elegant solution to this problem. When
DeltaComm initially registered for the domain name, it would have been
required to state its valuation to the registry (or, in our system, the cadaster).
The Harberger tax gives the domain name owner an incentive not to overstate its
valuation. Once Delta had realized the value of the domain name, it would have
paid Deltacomm a price equal to Deltacomm’s valuation and obtained the
domain name. The transaction would have taken a minute rather than four years.
The domain name presents a clear case for the Harberger system because it is
unlikely that another company that values delta.com more than Delta does
would value the domain name in a way connected to the value of the Delta
brand. This means that Delta can invest in publicizing its domain name without
much fear that it will lose its investment to a third party. Indeed, DeltaComm’s
experience shows that a buyer might well be harmed by Delta’s investment—
bombarded, like DeltaComm by inquiries from people who want to buy airline
tickets—unless the buyer was another airline that bought Delta and fully inter-
nalized Delta’s investments in its brand. Obviously bargaining problems could
still arise in such a setting, because Delta’s other assets would not be covered by
the Harberger tax, which is why we advocate extending it to corporate shares, as
we now discuss.
4.1.3 Natural resources and other publicly owned resources
Harberger taxation could also be applied to a range of government-owned
assets, including natural resources, public facilities, and public corporations.
Because the government already owns these resources, and in many cases sells
limited use rights to private citizens, implementing our scheme would not
disrupt long-established patterns of holdings but simply require changes to
the nature of licensing arrangements.
In many cases, such changes would improve investment incentives relative to
the status quo. Where the status quo license design involves fixed terms with
complete ownership (or control) during a period, the licensee fully captures the
value of any investment (or extraction forbearance) that accrues during the
license term but captures none of the benefit accruing after the license expir-
ation. This can lead to large inefficiencies and a strong need for discretionary
monitoring and regulation by the government, as licensees have powerful in-
centives to exploit the asset in the run up to the license expiration. Harberger
taxation, by creating a smooth partial property right over long time horizons,
offers better investment incentives for every unit of allocative distortion created
by the market power necessary to provide them. 43
43 See Gilbert & Shapiro (1990) for a formalization of this logic in the case of intellectual property.
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Applications of this sort are too numerous to describe in the detail.
Accordingly, we provide a brief list of some of the most salient applications.
. Natural resource extraction rights, including minerals, energy resources, fish-
eries, and timber. Here the tradeoff determining the optimal level of
Harberger taxation in license design is between the need to continuously
turn assets over to operators with the lowest costs of extraction, refinement,
and marketing (which change over time due to technological innovation,
entry, and personnel turnover) and the need to provide incentives both to
avoid excessively rapid or intensive exploitation that runs down the long-
term value of the asset and to encourage the creation of facilities for extraction
and investment in discovery of valuable resources within the leased region.
. Leasing of public lands for activities such as farming and cattle grazing. The
tradeoffs here are like those in natural resource extraction rights, but the
reasons why turnover across partial owners is needed is usually driven in
these cases more by generational change and local knowledge of terrain,
rather than technological advances and investments are driven by the regu-
lar maintenance and improvement of land.
. Publicly owned or highly regulated capital assets, essential facilities and
corporations, which are prevalent in the developing and ex-communist
world and significant in many developed mixed economies. These include
railways, electricity generation and distribution facilities, telecommunica-
tions infrastructure, and postal services. In these cases, both allocative ef-
ficiency and investment efficiency are leading concerns and arise in various
forms. Innovation, the entrance of new entrepreneurs with novel produc-
tion technologies or organizational strategies and the natural tendency of
existing owners to fall behind the times or become inefficient or lazy all
make the periodic turnover of assets to new owners crucial for productive
efficiency, as we will discuss further in the next section. On the contrary,
investment in research and development, engineering, operations, market-
ing and advertising are all critical to the productive employment of these
assets to maximize their value.
. Public housing, public hospitals, and other public facilities for the provi-
sion of private goods which have increasingly been privatized. While cur-
rently publicly owned, these facilities are either like public capital goods, as
described above or have many of the features of real property and personal
property that we detail further.
4.2 Business Assets
While, as we highlighted in the previous subsection, many productive capital
assets and natural resources are held by the state, the defining feature of
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capitalist economies is that most of the value of such assets resides in the hands
of privately held or publicly traded business concerns. Per the decomposition by
Matthew Ronglie and others, most capital is held by such concerns (Ronglie
2015). Recent literature in economics suggests the existence of large scale dis-
tortions in the allocation of such assets across firms. In a series of influential
papers, Chad Syverson has documented the wide dispersion in the productivity
with which firms employ assets even within narrowly defined and clearly
measured industries and the extent to which this productivity evolves over
time (Syverson 2004a,b, 2011). While some researchers have attributed this
persistent dispersion to financial constraints on firms, the market power
firms hold over their assets is another natural explanation as suggested by
Abhijit Banerjee and Benjamin Moll’s focus on inefficiencies in asset markets.44
Furthermore, as we emphasized in Subsection 3.2 above, while it is not a central
focus of our analysis, Harberger taxation has the additional benefit of relaxing
capital constraints by dramatically lowering the capitalized value of assets.
In the long term, imposing Harberger taxation upon such assets would be
essentially the same as the alteration of the licenses for publicly held assets so
that they incorporate Harberger taxation. However, because these assets are
currently held privately, taxing them could, depending on its implementation,
involve significant redistribution as we discussed in Subsection 3.1 above. We
will not repeat our discussion from there, except to say that whether such a
redistribution is desirable is largely orthogonal to the desirability of our pro-
posal; if it is undesirable, other corporate and business income taxes could be
eliminated with the revenue raised to offset the tax change in a manner that
would imply at most a very modest redistribution. In their calibration to cor-
porate assets, Weyl and Zhang find that a 2.5 percent rate is robustly near
optimal for a range of calibrations. This seems to us a natural starting place
for a Harberger tax on corporate assets and would generate roughly revenues
needed to eliminate other forms of capital taxation in the USA if it were decided
that such a use of revenue is desirable.
4.3 Corporate Acquisitions
The system of self-assessed taxation could be extended in many directions. An
obvious application is to corporate acquisition. When one corporation (or
person or group of people) seeks to take over another corporation, a messy
battle frequently ensues. The acquiring corporation must propose a price that is
high enough to satisfy the directors and shareholders of the target corporation.
44 See Moll (2014) for a primarily financial perspective and Banerjee & Moll (2010) for a broader
survey.
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The directors and shareholders—the sellers—have strong incentives to hold out
for a price that is greater than the value of the target corporation standing alone,
and this problem is exacerbated by the collective action problem among share-
holders, and the conflicts of interest between shareholders, managers, directors,
and other stakeholders (Grossman & Hart 1980). The current solution is a
messy system of bargaining and voting against the background of judicial ap-
praisal remedies. The irony of this system is that the judicial backstop assumes
that a government official—the judge—can make a valuation when the market
system is premised on the assumption that the government is incapable of
determining values. It is common wisdom that judicial appraisals are question-
able or even arbitrary.45
Now consider an alternative system. Each stockholder would have to disclose
to the cadaster the value she places on each unit of stock she owns. Obviously,
she must place a value on the last unit of this stock close to the market value of
the stock, given that she can always buy another unit of stock at this price.
However, following our discussion of substitutable assets in Section 2.3 above,
she may well value inframarginal units of stock above marginal units. For ex-
ample, owning at least one share of this stock may provide her some diversi-
fication or insurance value, which would disappear if the company were entirely
acquired by a new owner. She may have a sentimental attachment to the inde-
pendent existence of the firm. Or she may be a consumer of the firm’s products,
and believe that if entirely taken over, the firm will act less in her interests.
Whatever the reason, she may choose to assess her inframarginal shares above
the value of her marginal shares. The stockholders would pay a Harberger tax
on these shares and this would not imply double taxation (of corporate assets as
well as the financial assets written on them) because the market value of equity
thus declared would be deductible by the firm as a liability in aggregate (unless
double taxation was desired for some reason).
For concreteness, suppose there are many individuals each owning three
shares of a publicly traded company. Owners will set the value for their first
share v1 very close to the value of v1 set by other individuals. This common
value would be, in our world, the analog to the market price for the share.
Individuals would update this value frequently as the market price fluctuates
using an app that monitors such changes. Thus, an individual interested in
buying a third of the company will be able to do so at a price per share of v1
and anyone buying less than a third of the company will choose to do so by
buying the first share offered by every owner. Notice that even before worrying
45 In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (Del. Ch., May 31, 2016) (see also Kanda &
Levmore 1985, p. 434).
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about acquisitions, this would make the process of transacting shares much
simpler than at present. There would be no need for centralized stock markets.
Individuals wishing to sell would simply lower v1 ever so slightly below other
individuals’ values of v1 and their shares would be snapped up. Individuals
wishing to purchase would simply do so at the lowest set of available values
of v1. The cadaster itself would act as an always available limit order book. This
would also solve the problems of illiquidity and capital valuation that have
plagued the markets for a variety of securities, especially during times of finan-
cial distress. It would also make accounting and capital regulation much easier
and more transparent.
It would also aid in the process of corporate acquisition. Individuals would
likely value their second share at a value v2 significantly higher than the value
for their first share v1. They would know that anyone choosing to buy this
second share would be seeking a majority stake in the company and would
thus price this share at the value of losing control of the company for share-
holders like herself.46 This value would presumably be higher than the value of
the marginal share, because of both the reduced control and the reduced di-
versification. Individuals would value their third share v3 even more highly, as
its sale would be associated with the complete acquisition of the firm, and its
removal from the market. Thus, the price per share for a controlling stake and
for a full acquisition would be increasingly more expensive than for just buying
a few shares. Individuals would be taxed on their total valuation of their stake in
the company, v1+v2+v3, at a rate equal to the turnover in shares in the simplest
setting. 47
46 An important consideration in this setting is that the chance of any individual’s share being pivotal
to an acquisition strategy is quite small. Thus, unless the rate of the Harberger tax is set exactly right,
distortions to valuations can be quite large; see Mailath & Postlewaite (1990), for a more formal
rendition of this argument. This differs from the case of property that is either bought (or at least
may be bought) independently, where individuals are quite likely to be pivotal in determining
whether a sale proceeds. In those settings, a Harberger tax that is not set perfectly still does quite
well, as individuals have a strong incentive to report their values correctly to avoid affecting the
chance of sale. When individuals have a very small chance of being pivotal, Harberger taxation is
unlikely to be very effective in practice as it will require excessively fine tuning of the tax rates. In
these cases, mechanisms based on the assumption that individuals are unlikely to be pivotal (such as
the efficient voting mechanism proposed by Lalley & Weyl (2016)) will tend to perform better. For
an efficient and practical proposal for these cases that is complementary with our ideas here, see
Posner & Weyl (2014). When the pivotality of individuals is intermediate (such as when there is
some chance that an individual’s second shares will be bought by a purchaser who does not want all
shares, but just a large block), some combination of these two approaches will be optimal, such as a
baseline of allowing Harberger purchases, but with the right of a purchaser or sufficient owners to
trigger a quadratic vote on an offer. This logic also applies to other domains where individuals are
unlikely to be pivotal, including some of the externality evaluation examples we discuss below
further.
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While it would be more expensive per share than buying only a few shares,
the process of acquisition would be enormously simplified. Because of the tax,
the cost of purchase would exceed the value to current owners of maintaining
the corporation’s independence by far less than at present or not at all, reducing
the premia that inhibit efficient corporate takeovers. More importantly, the
elaborate freeze outs, negotiation, and other procedures could be avoided en-
tirely as fair prices for all assets would be publicly available and thus the market
for corporate control could be as liquid and low transaction cost as the market
for small stakes in firms. The potential acquirer would simply read off the
cadaster the price for acquiring the firm and lock these prices in if they were
worth paying. The holdout problem would be eliminated; conflicts of interests
among stakeholders would no longer cause delay and cost.
To be sure, the system would raise certain questions and come with its own
set of costs. Individuals would need to receive real-time advice and automat-
ically update the valuations of their shares to ensure that they do not get bought
up when market values change rapidly as a result of trading by individuals with
informational advantages. A natural way to ensure such a process worked
smoothly would be to slow transactions and the updating of values, for ex-
ample, only once a day. This might have other benefits in avoiding the costs
associated with high-frequency trading, as emphasized by Budish, Cramton, &
Shim (2015). Until such systems are in place, individuals would choose to value
their shares somewhat above market value to account for changing market
conditions, just as Glosten & Milgrom (1985) show market makers do at pre-
sent to guard against exploitation by informed traders.
4.4 Property Transactions
The most ambitious, though not necessarily the most important (given that
business assets are larger in aggregate) application of our approach is to trad-
itional property transactions, as these cover a large range of economic activity
and are likely to spark controversy. We now discuss how it would apply to real
property, personal property, and to an area where it might yield the greatest
benefits, eminent domain.
4.1.1 Real Property
The application of our approach to real property builds on institutions that are
largely in place. Currently, when people buy real property they register their
47 In a richer design, marginal shares would be taxed more heavily than inframarginal shares, given that
the optimal turnover for these is less frequent (corporate acquisitions are less common than are
small transactions), though there would have be careful design of the definition of these categories to
avoid gaming.
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ownership in a public recording system.48 Moreover, in most places people
must pay property taxes based on the appraised value of their real property.
Our approach adds three elements. First, individuals must report a self-assessed
value for their property, which they may update at any time unless a buyer has
asked for the price to be frozen so that she can look at the property. The owner’s
self-assessed valuation would replace the current practice of appraiser-gener-
ated valuations. Second, the owner must pay a tax based on his self-assessed
valuation. Third, the owner must sell his property to anyone who offers to buy
it for the self-assessed value.
While the system may seem radical, it exhibits important continuities with
the existing regime of property law. Under the current system, people are not
perfectly secure in their rights to real property. Most people who own homes do
so subject to mortgages; if they lose their job and miss payments, the holder of
the mortgage may force a sale. Even more people are renters and have at best a
tenuous claim on retaining their residence past the end of their lease. Everyone
is subject to the risk of eminent domain, which allows governments to take real
property if they pay a judicially determined “market price”. Note that the
market price award in eminent domain proceedings will almost certainly be
lower than the self-assessed price that an owner would receive under the pro-
posed system because the self-assessed valuation includes one’s subjective or
idiosyncratic enjoyment of one’s real property.49 People should be indifferent as
to whether their property is taken by the government or taken by a private
individual. Moreover, people who deeply care about keeping their home can
reduce the risk of a (private or public) taking to an extremely low level by
announcing a high self-assessment.
Our mechanism would also not be entirely unfamiliar to ordinary people.
When people buy insurance, they effectively provide a self-assessed valuation to
the insurance company. The premium on the insurance, like the Harberger tax,
ensures that people do not exaggerate their valuation—if they do, they must pay
a higher premium. At the same time, they will be willing to self-assess a high
value and pay a high premium if the insured-against loss is significant enough.
Insurance law puts limits on people’s freedom to self-assess: it is illegal for
insurance companies to cover an amount greater than the anticipated loss.
But within this limit, people can buy as little or as much insurance as they want.
An interesting and pertinent example is life insurance. When a person buys
life insurance from an insurer, she necessarily reveals to the insurance company
her prediction about the economic loss that will be suffered by beneficiaries if
48 See Bell & Parchomovsky (2016), for details.
49 On the pervasiveness of undercompensation in eminent domain proceedings, see Serkin (2005).
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the insured dies. This is otherwise private information. The premium cost en-
sures that the insured will state an accurate prediction, to the best of her ability.
Moreover, various other legal doctrines work in different ways to counter the
harmful monopoly effect of private property, and in doing so create the risk that
an owner will be effectively forced to sell an entitlement. Consider the following
examples:
4.1.1.1 Liability rules for inadvertent destruction.—If a neighbor’s tree topples
over and crashes into your house, you do not have property rule protection; you
are only able to sue for damages under a liability rule. Indeed, damages could be
zero if the tree was not maintained negligently. While these legal rules are
second nature to a lawyer, they are at variance with monopoly. If the logic of
the traditional libertarian position were maintained, the neighbor should have
bargained for the right to allow his tree to fall and damage your property;
having failed to do so, he would go to jail. But under such a system, people
would be reluctant to leave their basements. The liability rule is used to soften
monopoly power in settings where it would be prohibitively expensive for
people to refrain from infringing on other people’s property rights.
4.1.1.2 Necessity.—In a similar vein, the law permits people to intentionally
infringe on property rights in emergency situations if they pay the market value
of the owner’s loss. In Vincent v. Lake Erie,50 a ship captain secured his ship to a
dock despite orders to leave because a storm would have sunk the ship if he had
taken it out to sea. The court held that the ship owner must pay only for the
damage the ship did to the dock despite the intentional infringement on the
dock owner’s property rights. As in the case of inadvertent harm, the necessity
rule weakens the monopoly power of the owner to allow for an allocatively
efficient transfer—in this case, occupation of the dock from the owner to the
ship owner (Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 100).
4.1.1.3 Adverse possession.—The rule of adverse possession (Micel & Sirman
1995, p. 164; Marra 2011, p. 14–15) can also be explained by our framework.
When the owner does not object to an overt and hostile use of his property, the
owner’s valuation of the property is likely to be low, lower than that of the
adverse possessor who has invested in the same property despite the risk that he
will not gain title to it. This complicated mix of encroachment and noninter-
ference provides evidence that the transfer is allocatively efficient because the
self-assessed value is likely to be close to zero (Fennell 2006). Related doctrines
give the public easements over private property over which the public has
customarily traveled (Rose 1986, p. 723–727).
50 109 Minn. 456 (1910).
104 ~ Posner and Weyl: Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly
4.1.1.4 Air rights and related restrictions.—Because the common law of prop-
erty evolved centuries ago, legislatures have from time to time adjusted property
rights to reflect new technologies and changing conditions. The most famous
example involves air rights. Under the common law, landowners owned rights
to the space over their property, extending indefinitely into the ether. With the
development of air travel, legislatures passed laws that restricted air rights to the
space below the flight paths of airplanes. The legislatures recognized
that the value of that space to the landowner is close to zero, but she could
use it to extract monopoly rents from airlines. To solve this problem of allo-
cative efficiency, legislatures simply modified the property right (Rule 2014,
p. 166). In cases of conflict—where air travel at low heights interfered with
enjoyment of one’s property—courts have agreed that the landowner should
receive market damages but not the right to block airplanes from flying over
their property.51
4.1.1.5 Public trust doctrine and other related public property rights.—Many
types of property are owned publicly, or are subject to public regulations that
greatly limit the ability of private individuals to control and exploit the property
(Merrill 2012). More than a billion acres of land in the USA are owned by the
national government and preserved as wilderness, rangeland, and national
parks. Navigable rivers and coastal areas are also typically owned or controlled
by the national or state governments. In many states, beaches are publicly
owned or open to the public via easements. Governments build roads and
either provide drivers with free access or charge a toll. They preserve and regu-
late fisheries off the coasts. While standard public-good explanations go a long
way to explaining these doctrines (Rose 1986; Merrill 2012), they also illustrate
our concern with the monopoly problem.
Consider, for example, the widespread government ownership of grazing
areas (see Bureau of Land Management 2016). Suppose that pastures flourish
without any sort of complicated investment scheme; the only way to “invest” in
a pasture is to ensure that it is not destroyed through overgrazing. Further,
suppose that experience and expertise can determine optimal grazing in a rela-
tively objective way. We might, therefore, believe that the government need not
delegate pastures to private individuals in the form of property rights: the
investment problem is simple enough to be solved through a straightforward
licensing scheme that limits the number of users. Then the issue is only one of
allocative efficiency: ensuring that cattle owners who benefit the most from the
pasture are the ones who use it. This can be easily accomplished with an auction
51 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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that grants access to the highest bidders.52 Through public ownership, efficient
allocation is achieved without a sacrifice of investment incentives. A similar
argument can be made about fisheries. By contrast, we suspect that investment
efficiency for highways is more complicated. The question is not just one of how
many cars should drive on a road, but how much money should be invested in
maintenance, safety improvements, and the like. This might explain why private
toll roads exist alongside public roads.
Property law scholars have long recognized that “public property” doctrines
may be justified in part by monopoly problems, including the problem of
assembling pieces of privately owned land (often called the holdout problem)
and the problem of denial of access that would occur if a single person owned a
roadway or navigable river (Rose 1986; Merrill 2012, p. 91–92). A monopoly
problem can also arise when one person mistakenly builds on another person’s
land (Merrill 2012, p. 96). However, as noted above, it also very much the
tendency of the law and economics literature to treat the monopoly problem
as exceptional—justifying a limited number of legal exceptions to the dominant
paradigm of private property.
4.1.1.6 Takings for private use.—Federal takings law limits eminent domain to
“public use”, but the Supreme Court has all but read this limitation out of the
Constitution. In Kelo v. New London, it held that a city could condemn private
property to make way for private economic development.53 While the court’s
holding produced a public outcry (Somin 2009, p. 21082114), it endorsed a
longstanding government function, which Abraham Bell has aptly called “gov-
ernment-mediated private takings” (Bell 2009, p. 548–549). Not only have cities
and states used eminent domain to obtain property which was resold to devel-
opers, they have frequently delegated the eminent domain power to private
companies, including railroads, bridge builders, and riparian owners who
built dams that flooded their neighbors. As Bell persuasive argues, “private
takings” are justified when bargaining failures prevent the transfer of property
from less valued to more valued uses through private consensual transactions—
what we have called the monopoly problem. However, Bell does not come to
grips with the serious problem of valuation. He argues that fair market value
can be used to value property for “private takings” (id., p. 580–81), as it does for
public takings, but market value is not an accurate estimate of the value of
property in precisely the circumstances in which private taking power is
52 Under the current system, fees are determined largely by mimicking the market—the public grazing
lands exist alongside privately owned fields, which are leased out. See id. In a more comprehensive
system, in which there is no comparable private market, auctions would need to be used.
53 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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justified—when monopoly problems interfere with bargaining. Bell suggests
that damages could be set above fair market value to prevent undercompensa-
tion, but that just creates the corresponding risk of overcompensation, which
blocks value-maximizing sales.
4.2.1 Personal Property
Unlike the case of real property, few legal doctrines address the monopoly
problem for personal property. Of course, if a person accidentally—rather
than intentionally—takes another person’s umbrella, the victim’s remedy is
just the return of the umbrella, so in this sense the property right is not as
strong as it could be. And in principle, eminent domain is available for personal
property. But it is rarely used. We can imagine three reasons for the stricter
treatment of personal property. First, it is more likely to trade in a competitive
market, so the owner of an umbrella or other object will rarely have more than a
trivial amount of market power. Second, many types of personal property are
not durable, except trivially—prepared food, for example. On the contrary,
people rarely need to invest in everyday types of personal property (except,
perhaps, to avoid breaking them), so property rule protection hardly seems
necessary. Third, and partly as a result, optimal turnover rates for some types of
personal property are likely quite low because individuals develop tight per-
sonal attachments to some personal effects.
While personal property is a very small part of the aggregate capital stock, it is
worth exploring what the world would look like if the self-assessment tax were
applied to personal property if only for the vividness it brings to the underlying
problems. We use automobiles as our running example; as durable and valuable
goods, they are a good candidate for such a tax. Imagine that when a person
buys a car, she registers the title through an app supplied by the government.
She also writes down her personal valuation of the car, which (presumably)
exceeds the price she paid. The app would periodically ask her to update her
valuation of the car. She could also use a setting to allow the app to calculate her
valuation by itself using a formula that starts with her valuation but depreciates
it over time per usage (a GPS device would automatically register mileage with
the app, which would use data from another sensor to record wear and tear on
brakes and other components).
Other people could take the car using the same app on their own phones.
Suppose someone sees the car parked on the street and likes the way it looks. He
scans in the car’s VIN and his app reveals the car’s current valuation. He hits a
button and money is transferred from his bank account to the owner’s. He can
use his app to unlock the car door, start the engine, and drive away.
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Before we address the problems with this plan (many of which will already
have occurred to the reader), let us consider the benefits. The days of bargaining
with car dealers would be over. The future car dealership would, in effect, be the
whole world rather than a building that one must visit. Selling a car would also
be immensely easier. One could instruct the app to progressively lower the price
until someone pays it. (Potential buyers could set their apps with the specifi-
cations and prices they are willing to pay for cars. When a match is made, the
location of the car is disclosed to the buyer who can go pick it up.) The currently
high transaction costs associated with buying and selling cars would be reduced
to zero. And people who develop a sentimental attachment to their car can
register a higher self-assessed valuation and pay the additional tax to fend off
buyers.
Now let us turn to the problems. What if you drive to a remote location and
someone buys your car, leaving you stranded? This problem could be addressed
using the approach we outlined in Subsection 3.3 above: allowing individuals to
delay delivery of a possession in a prespecified manner and subject to certain
rules. Or what if you have some valuable goods or personal documents in your
trunk when another person drives off with your car? These documents could
simply be listed separately from the car as possessions; the law would require the
return of any property not purchased by the buyer. Furthermore, people would
come to think of themselves as leasing rather than owning cars, and would be
careful about leaving valuables in their cars if they have a low self-assessed value,
just as they do when they rent a car from Hertz or Avis, or use a Zipcar. Finally,
what if you have a developed a sentimental attachment to your car—you have
spent years tinkering with the engine and lovingly polishing the chrome fen-
ders? Are you really required to take the risk that someone will drive off with
your car?
This last problem was addressed in Subsection 3.2 above. Those of us who
care deeply about our automobiles know that there is a small risk that they will
be stolen or totaled in an accident. We accept these risks as a part of life.
Through a high self-assessment, we can ensure that the risk of someone
taking the car is similarly remote—and, in addition, if she does, we can
ensure that we will be fully compensated for the sentimental loss.
4.2.3 Eminent Domain and the Problem of Valuation
One of the great problem of takings law is that of valuation. Courts typically
award owners the market value of their property but commentators have com-
plained that in doing so they disregard the subjective valuation of owners, who
frequently have sentimental attachment to their houses and neighborhoods
(Serkin 2005). In addition, appraised valuations of real property are notoriously
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unreliable (Chang 2012a, p. 49–53). As a result, owners are usually undercom-
pensated (Serkin 2005). Under the self-assessment approach, the government
would pay the self-assessed valuation, which would reflect the owner’s subject-
ive enjoyment of her real property. This was one of the justifications for
Levmore’s proposal, and for Bell and Parchomovsky’s elaborations upon it
(Bell & Parchomovsky 2001, 2007).
However, the self-assessment tax would, in fact, make eminent domain sig-
nificantly less important than it currently is (as Levmore (1982) himself recog-
nized). To see why, observe that eminent domain is most frequently used to put
together transportation networks—roads, railroads, canals, and so on. Under
our approach, government involvement in constructing these transportation
links is no longer necessary because private companies could buy up adjoining
plots using the self-assessed valuation. The holdout problem, which is the only
justification for government intervention through eminent domain, is
solved without government involvement. Not only would Harberger taxation
make eminent domain unnecessary; it would also make property assembly
more flexible and less socially costly as developers could explore a range of
potential sites for their development freely rather than rigidly targeting a site
where the value of the targeted plots might be higher than she expects; see
Subsection 2.4 above. In fact, while we do not pursue this application further
here, this approach could be extended to regulatory takings if individuals could
list values for various subentitlements, such as the right to use their land in
various ways.
Even under our regime, governments could continue to use “eminent do-
main”—for example, to obtain property for government buildings, military
bases, and other public facilities. However, there would be no distinction be-
tween such uses and an ordinary purchase by a private party.
Eminent domain based on self-assessment taxes has been tried, but has been
unsuccessful because the probability of a taking is so low that people have a
strong incentive to undervalue their property (Chang 2012b). It may be that
governments set the multiplier improperly; but the real problem is that if forced
sales are extremely rare, people will not take seriously the risk that they will
occur, or will have trouble calculating a self-assessment based on a very low and
uncertain probability. Furthermore, because government-led eminent domain
purchases are usually of large bundles of land, individuals are unlikely to believe
themselves pivotal in the assembly and thus have weaker incentives to truthfully
reveal their valuation. Individuals are much more likely to be pivotal in the
purchase of their individual plot by a private party, creating stronger value
revelation incentives, valuations which can then be carried over to the assembly
of complementary plots.
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4.5 Private Sector Applications
While our primary focus in this article is on applications to property law and
public policy, Harberger taxation may also be useful in private settings, such as
the design of “sharing economy” platforms and internal markets within cor-
porations. We now briefly discuss these applications, which are not the primary
focus of analysis, both to provide additional applications that may require less
radical social reform and to illustrate the limits of purely private applications
that may explain why Harberger taxation has not yet been broadly adopted in
the private sector.
To see how Harberger taxation could be applied privately, it is first useful to
consider a naı¨ve potential application that would not be profitable to imple-
ment. Suppose a current owner of an asset, say a house, were to offer to sell that
house with a Harberger license to a potential future possessor with the stipu-
lation that the current owner making the “sale” would collect the resultant tax
revenues. Such a plan would facilitate more efficient turnover and generate both
an initial sale revenue for the current owner and a future stream of “rental”
payments. However, Weyl and Zhang show that such a strategy would not be
profitable for the current owner relative to simply optimally auctioning off
complete ownership. Intuitively, the benefit of the Harberger tax relative to
full ownership accrues to the (potential) future purchasers rather than to the
owner. While this would maximize social surplus, it would not maximize the
surplus captured by the current monopolistic owner. Substituting a Harberer
license for full ownership is a bit like putting a piece of intellectual property into
the public domain: good for the world, but not for the current owner.
To capture the benefit of Harberger taxation, an individual would have to be
able to charge a participation fee to potential future purchasers for the right to
be able to exercise the option to purchase embedded in the Harberger license.
Combined with the costs of enforcing and administer the cadaster that the
Harberger tax system requires, the costs of marketing and obtaining profitable
participation in such a service would almost certainly require the “platform”
administering it to have access to a large pool of assets. For example, a platform
could try to run a town’s real estate on Harberger tax principles, requiring the
paying of a poll tax to live in the town and then running all real estate through
the Harberger tax system. The benefits of the system should imply individuals
are willing to pay to live there for the benefits it brings. Or a platform could buy
up many cars or pieces of commercial real estate and offer a “sharing economy”
service based on these. While such an idea is an interesting business propos-
ition, the substantial capital it would require to take off perhaps suggests that it
is not very surprising that it has not been tried and will not be tried unless
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a sufficiently persuasive case is made to a wealthy individual or investment
institution.
5. IS THE HARBERGER TAX UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The Harberger tax, if applied prospectively, is clearly constitutional. Imagine
that the government decides to subject land that it owns to the Harberger tax.
Rather than lease the land out for grazing, it announces that it will “sell” the
land subject to the Harberger tax regime under a “Harberger license”. The
government could implement the regime by initially auctioning off plots of
land. The winners of the auction would periodically self-assess the value of the
land and pay a tax based on that value, and be required to transfer the land to
anyone who offered to buy it at the self-assessed value. As we have discussed, a
similar approach could be put into place for various types of administrative
property, such as unallocated spectrum and domain names.
We see no constitutional objection to this arrangement. Property owned
under the Harberger tax regime is very like a leasehold. We can think of the
owner’s property rights as those of a lessee where the lease provides that the
term is unlimited—that is, not for a definite period—but subject to termination
whenever a third party offers to pay a higher “rent” (i.e., tax) to the landlord
(the government), who exercises the right to reassign the lease to that third
party. Since the government can own property and lease it out, and the law of
property gives the landlord great freedom in designing the terms of the lease,
constitutional law does not bar this arrangement.
But we also envision that Harberger tax regime replacing the current system
of property rights—as applied to some or many categories of property—and
such a transition would raise questions relating to the Takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Imagine, for example, that a state government announced that
henceforth all real property would be subject to the Harberger tax. Although
taxes are not subject to the Takings clause (Pen˜alver 2004), the Harberger tax is
more than a tax. It involves an additional element, the extinction of a significant
element of the right to exclude.54 This right is of considerable value to the
owner.
Would the Harberger tax, therefore, violate the Takings clause? We think not.
The Harberger tax is a redefinition of property rights of the sort that has
occurred many times in American history. For example, early in the
54 From an economic perspective, the forced revelation of the owner’s valuation is also a cost. See
supra. We suspect a court would not regard this requirement as a property-rights infringement,
though we are not sure. On whether private information is property subject to the Takings clause,
see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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Republic, many states abolished the fee tail, converting then-existing entailed
estates into fees simple. This change in property law extinguished a valuable
right possessed by direct descendants of the original grantee: to obtain the estate
in fee tail upon the death of the last holder of the estate in fee tail, regardless of
that person’s intent. The abolition of the fee tail effected a transfer of wealth to
the holders of the estate in fee tail, who were suddenly free to sell the land, or
dispose of it in their will as they chose. Nonetheless, the laws abolishing the fee
tail were considered constitutionally unproblematic. James Madison himself
approved of the abolition of the fee tail in Virginia, and presided over its abo-
lition in federally owned territories while he was president, apparently without
believing that the extinction of the fee tail violated the Takings clause (Hart
2001). Madison believed in private property as a general matter but complained
that the fee tail resulted in a “too unequal distribution of property, . . . which
generated examples in the opulent class inauspicious to the habits of the other
classes” (id. at 190). Abolition of the existing entails would redistribute wealth
and help weaken the rentier class.
While the pecuniary effects of the abolition of the fee tail were probably not
large, two other changes in property rights in America were of great signifi-
cance. The abolition of slavery—of property rights in human beings—effected a
massive redistribution of wealth from slave owners to former slaves. And the
abolition of coverture transferred a huge amount of wealth (specifically, the
entitlement to the wife’s wages and the income from the wife’s property) from
husbands to wives. While the question of whether slave owners could be
deprived of their property without compensation gave rise to great controversy
that was resolved only by war, the abolition of the property rights of married
men seems to have taken place without any debate about its constitutionality
under the Takings clause or related state takings clauses.55 These precedents
might be taken to establish a principle that the Takings clause does not apply to
redefinitions of property rights, similar in spirit to treatment of taxation under
that clause, and very much in the spirit of the view that the Takings clause is
intended to prevent “singling out” of individuals to bear public burdens but not
to block large-scale changes in the distribution of wealth.56
Under modern doctrine, however, an argument could be made that the
Harberger tax would count as a regulatory taking that requires compensation.
The thickets of the regulatory taking doctrine are too deep for us to enter within
55 We scoured the history books and found nothing on this topic. See, e.g., Hartong (2000); Rabkin
(1980); Basch (1982).
56 See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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the confines of this article (Pen˜alver 2004). We have found no cases involving
anything resembling the Harberger tax, and the standard precedents are too
complex and inconsistent to provide a clear basis for evaluating the tax.
However, it is reasonably clear that the Harberger tax would satisfy the toothless
“public use” requirement because it aims to improve the general welfare.
Indeed, the aim of facilitating transfers is like the goal of the Hawaii statute
that abolished an oligarchic system of property rights by forcing sales of housing
to private citizens, a goal which was approved by the Supreme Court in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.57
And if a court concluded that the government must pay compensation to
those who lost money because of the transition to the Harberger tax, then the
efficiency of the regime is such that payment of such compensation would be
possible. Still, given the vastness of the sums involved, it would probably be
necessary to introduce the Harberger tax gradually, over a period. This could
be done by initially applying the tax to limited categories of property, or setting
it at a very low rate, and then expanding the categories and increasing the rate
over time. The government could also, in principle, sell bonds to finance emi-
nent domain proceedings against property owners, and then auction off the
property subject to the Harberger tax, using the proceeds from the auctions and
the tax to repay the bonds.
6. CONCLUSION
The benefits from a Harberger tax would be massive. To get a rough sense of its
value, consider an immobile factory in the rust belt; its owner wants to sell it but
still obtains some value from operating it. The owner gains a profit of $100,000
per month from the factory. Suppose that she expects this payoff to continue
into the indefinite future and that the discount rate is 5 percent; this corres-
ponds to a value for the factory of $2.4 million. Accountants value the factory at
$3.6 million (or a monthly value of $150,000). Finally, suppose that buyers
come along once every three months and have a value for the factory that
has the same modal value as the appraised value, but has substantial spread.
The owner maximizes her return by listing the factory at a price of $4.8 million,
an amount that compensates her for the expected delay from failing to make
sales at a lower price. At this price, it takes two years to sell the factory. A typical
person who would have bought the factory if the owner had listed it at $2.4
million but would not buy at $4.8 million would value the factory at the
appraised value of $3.6 million. Thus, the factory is suboptimally occupied
57 See also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2004).
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for 21 months, losing $5,000 of social value for each of these months or a total
of $105,000.
Suppose this factory gets into a similar situation once every five years; over
the life of the factory, the total expected discounted loss from such failure to
make efficient transfers of the factory is approximately four times the loss in any
single episode or a total of $420,000 or about 12 percent of the appraised value.
Weyl & Zhang’s (2017) calculations suggest that this is about twice the loss on a
typical business asset in the USA. They furthermore calculate that, at best,
Harberger taxation could alleviate 80 percent of these harms and that imposing
such a tax (of 2.5 percent per year) would reduce the value of factories by 2
percent because of reduced investment. Thus, they suggest a 2.5 percent tax
which they calculate reduces investment value by under 1 percent and still
achieves more than 70 percent of the total allocative benefits, thereby overall
increasing the value of business assets on average by 5 percent (PropertyWire
2016). As business assets are currently worth greater than $50 trillion, the
benefit of Harberger taxation for such assets alone is more than $2 trillion.
The benefits would be further increased if the tax were applied to automobiles,
spectrum, art, and so on, and greater still if one incorporates our “all in” ana-
lysis of how the revenue would be used (Subsection 2.1 above). Altogether we
believe it is reasonable to expect gains of about 5 percent of income or roughly
$800 billion annually in the USA and roughly $5 trillion globally.
Yet even beyond these large gains, we believe the scope of the benefits
Harberger taxation offers extends to many areas of the law well beyond the
standard conceptions of property law. While some of these applications may
seem farfetched and are beyond the scope of our main argument, we conclude
by speculating on how our proposal may be extended to these other areas of
law.
Harberger taxation could be applied to intellectual property rights to deal
with the infamous problem of patent thickets and trolls (Eisenberg & Heller
1998). If intellectual property had to be self-assessed and was taxed, with cor-
responding increases in its duration and possibly even the payment of some of
the associated fees to the original inventor to maintain incentives to innovate,
this might significantly mitigate the problem of patent trolls buying up swaths
of intellectual property just to holdup potential users (Cohen, Gurun, &
Kominers 2016). It would also help avoid the holdout problems associated
with assembling many complementary intellectual property rights to create
standards or products that require many patents together.58
58 For a proposal along these lines, see Abramowicz & Duffy (2009, pp. 1598–1600).
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Consider also extension of the Harberger tax to rights not to be harmed by
pollution or other externalities. Under the current legal system, courts and
regulators struggle to determine fair valuations (Posner & Sunstein 2005).
Rather than these harms being dealt with by juries and benefit-cost analysis
based on econometric estimates of the statistical value of life and other goods,
individuals might self-assess the value of various harms to their life or quality of
life, being forced to pay taxes based on their self-assessed valuations, and then
receiving damages based on these valuations if they are injured as a result of a
tort (Aldy & Viscusi 2008). The Harberger tax would solve the problem of
valuation in tort cases just as it does for eminent domain cases, allowing regu-
lators and juries to focus on issues of causation.59
In the most radical extension, Harberger taxation of human capital could be
extended to labor. Individuals could be forced to pay a tax on the self-assessed
value of their potential income (the value of their time) rather than being taxed
on their actual income. This would eliminate the distortionary effects of labor
income taxation and the monopoly power that talented workers exert over
employers. Employers who hire this labor would then be forced to pay taxes
on the labor they now possess, reducing the market power of employers over
labor vis-a`-vis another potential employer, which they now possess because of
firm-specific investments by workers and related factors.
These extensions, especially the last, raise numerous questions, practical chal-
lenges, and philosophical concerns that we cannot confront here. However, at a
time when so many social questions are being unsettled by slow economic
growth and rising inequality, reform proposals that may once have seemed
esoteric should be given serious consideration. This makes them an exciting
topic for future research.
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